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The thesis reviews the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe;
analyzes there affect on Western security; and assesses the United States
Department of Defense's possible options in terms of forces and the budget.
The main findings are: (1) The Warsaw Pact threat to NATO and the United
States has been significantly reduced. (2) The future of European security
centers on the issue of Germany. (3) A new mission for NATO is needed
which will reflect a greater emphasis on NATO's political capabilities. As
East-West confrontation recedes and the prospects for East-West cooperation
advance, NATO can contribute to meeting the new challenges and helping in
determining the path for the evolution of European and Atlantic security.
(4) The United States must revise the military budget to seize the
opportunities presented by the events in 1989 and, at the same time, maintain
a military capable of defending our interests and meeting the uncertainties of
the future. The true challenge for future military budgets will be to use the
international opportunity to save money in a sensible manner that matches
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The status quo in the Soviet Union is changing and its hegemony over
Eastern Europe is dissolving. The reaction by Western Europe and the United
States, in light of domestic problems, demands a re-evaluation of the United
States' national interest related to European security.
The traditional view for ensuring Western European security depends on
NATO conventional and nuclear deterrence to "contain" the forces of the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. As Eastern Europe attempts the
transition to social democracies, the Soviet leadership advocates
multilateralism, devolution and demilitarization, and the two Germanies
move, seemingly inexorably, toward some form of unity, the question of
NATO's basic assumptions must be reevaluated. Under the circumstances,
creative rethinking is required.
Continued political changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
provides challenge and opportunity for Western planners. These bolder sets
of assumptions must address the new threats realistically and reevaluate the
U.S. national and multilateral interests. This could lead to significant
changes in defense spending and the presence of U.S. forces in Europe.
The Department of Defense (DOD) must provide well thought out, long-
range guidance for forces and budget realignment. The DOD has a rare
opportunity to create a new defense posture for Europe.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE
The thesis will assess the current military forces structure and alignment
in NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations. It will then review the changes that
appear to affect the status quo. It will analyze the options and implications of
change for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe It will
then review the implications to the United States in terms national security
interests and forces deployment. Finally, it will analyze the United States
Department of Defense's possible options in terms of forces and the budget.
C. METHODOLOGY
The basic form of this study is descriptive. This thesis is based on research
data via a comprehensive review of literature and also through personal
interviews conducted with academics, national security and defense officials
and congressional staffs.
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE
The rest of this thesis consists of four chapters.
Chapter II provides background on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This
chapter will analyze the history and status quo of NATO.
Chapter III examines the changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union.
Chapter IV provides an analysis of how the changes in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union will affect European security.
Chapter V provides an analysis of the changing relationships in NATO
and the Warsaw Pact.
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Chapter VI provides an analysis of the budgetary implications of NATO-
Warsaw Pact changes for the U.S. Department of Defense.
Chapter VII analyzes and presents conclusions based on the present
research. It will also outline areas for future research.
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II. BACKGROUND ON NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT
A. BACKGROUND ON NATO
By the late 1940s, many in the United States and Europe feared the
collapse of Western Europe from the combined threats of Soviet
expansionism and the chaotic political, economic and social conditions in the
region. Advancement in war technology created a world too small for the
United States to ignore and made it impossible to return to pre-World War II
isolationism. The war created a European power vacuum. In order to avoid
Soviet domination and social-political deterioration in the West, the United
States filled this vacuum. The remedy for post-war uncertainty in Europe
was massive U.S. aid to the economies of Western Europe and closer security
relations with the United States as the dominant member.
President Truman announced in a message to Congress calling for
financial aid to Greece and Turkey on 12 March 1947 that "... it must be the
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure."' Truman followed
George Kennan's suggestion that U.S. support could not be merely military
but needed to include other forms of aid because, "... the seeds of totalitarian
regimes are nurtured in misery and want."2
]Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed.,(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica,
1987), 3, 21:799.
2Quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan,NATO and The United States: The
Enduring Alliance, Twayne Publishers, 1988, p. 15.
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On 5 June of the same year George C. Marshall, United States Secretary of
State, proposed at Harvard a European Recovery Program for economic
rehabilitation. The Marshall Plan followed through on that part of the
Truman Doctrine which realized the threat to Europe was not only military,
but also social and political. Communism had the best chance "... where
hunger and hopelessness prevailed."3 As important, the Marshall Plan
recognized a cure could not be imposed on Europe by the United States but
had to be a plan that required European initiative and mutual aid. It stressed
"that economic revival must stem from the energies and will of the people
themselves., 4
The long range U.S. objective was to break down economic barriers and
national animosities in Europe. In addition, it intended to bring Germany
back into the European community. According to Paul Hoffman, the
American administrator of the plan, America's ultimate goal for the Marshall
Plan was to "get Europe on her feet and off our backs." 5 The first formal
European response to the Marshall Plan was a 50 year treaty of mutual




5 Quoted in Peter Foot, Defense Burden-Sharing in the Atlantic
Community 1945-1954, Center for Defense Studies, 1981, p. 13., from U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Extension of the
European Recovery Program, (Washington: USGPO, 1974), p.2 4 0 .
5
Foot states that without Stalin the alliance may never have occurred.
Soviet aggressiveness, such as the Berlin blockade started three months after
the Brussels Treaty on 24 June, accelerated closer American and European
security relations. Thus, the Atlantic alliance grew in importance because of
the breakdown of security agreements between the United States and the
Soviet Union, and a loss of faith in the United Nations as the means for
solving the global differences. 6
The Vandenburg Resolution, adopted on 11 June 1948, attempted to keep
American interests in Europe within the framework of the United Nations
Charter. Most important, however, it cleared many of the legal roadblocks to
United Stated participation in an Atlantic alliance. Even with continued
American stated suspicion of Europeans' intentions, as well as European
resistance to sharing Europe with the U.S. and their frustrations in reaching
European unity, this closer Atlantic relationship took the form of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington by
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
President Truman announced in September 1950 that the U.S. would
place a substantial military force in Europe under the command of General
Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR). In October of the same year, French Prime Minister Rene Pleven
proposed creating a European military force, including German contingents,
within the framework of NATO. Greece and Turkey joined NATO in
6 Foot, p. 7-8.
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February 1952, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in May
1955.
France's continual distrust in the alliance culminated in President de
Gaulle's letters to alliance leaders in March 1966 announcing France's
withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure and expectation of a
quick removal of all NATO forces. Spain became the sixteenth member in
December 1981.
Prior to the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty, a cornerstone of
America's foreign policy was "abstention from European political and
military entanglements. ' 7 American isolationism dated back to President
Washington's Neutrality Act of 1774 and his warning in 1796 to avoid
entangling alliances. The reason to avoid alliances was based on a distrust of
the European dynastic order. Not only was America to isolate itself in order
avoid being duped into fighting one European power for the sake of another,
but also for the sake of preserving democracy and the popular sovereignty
theory. 8
Altho-gh isolationism was the cornerstone of American diplomatic
history prior to World War II, people such as Thomas Jefferson thought it
was still in the United States' national interest that Europe remained
balanced without one single dominant power. From 1812 to World War I,
7Kaplan, p. 1.
8The section on the development and downfall of American isolationism
is largely based on a lecture by Prof. David S. Yost, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, held 16 May 1990.
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the United States was in a comfortable and privileged position to be able to
avoid alliances.
Isolationism started breaking down with the United States involvement
in World War I. After the War, Britain and France believed a Europe could
not be balanced without U.S. involvement. Regardless, America's tradition
prevailed when the senate rejected on 19 March 1920 United States
participation in the League of Nations.
In the 1920s and '30s, America tried to reconcile the new Germany with
the rest of Europe. In 1923, U.S. Secretary of State, Charles E. Hugher, warned
that the Bolshevism of Germany was a greater threat to Europe than German
militarism. The 1930s brought the Depression, rise of Hitler and a triumph of
isolationists in America defeating attempts to influence Europe and restore
Germany.
America's involvement in Europe via NATO was a break from this past.
The Vandenburg Resolution was the final break from American isolationism
and was a notice to Stalin that a pact of cooperative action was on its way. At
first, America merely agreed to join the Alliance Treaty. Troop involvement
came later. In May 1949, the following exchange occurred between Senator
Hickenlooper and Under Secretary of State Acheson before the United States
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings on the North Atlantic
Treaty:
Senator Hickenlooper:
I believe you said earlier in your testimony today that it was
contemplated that a great portion of the armament, or the developed
armament, of western Europe, in the nations of this pact, would be
carried under their own weight. I presume that that refers also to the
manpower in their armies. I am interested in getting the answers as to
8
whether or not we are expected to supply substantial numbers-by that, I
do not mean a thousand or two, or 500, or anything of that kind, but very
substantial numbers-of troops and troop organizations of American
troops, to implement the land power of western Europe prior to
aggression.
Is that contemplated under article 3, where we agree to maintain and
develop the collective capacity to resist? In other words, are we going to
be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or
less permanent contribution to the development of these countries'
capacity to resist?
Secretary Acheson:
The answer to that question, Senator is a clear and absolute "No."9
The primary interest of Europeans in an alliance with the United States
was for national survival. Europe was in no condition to repair itself and
only the Americans had the power and, since it produced close to half of the
world's gross national product (GNP), the resources to save them. The
formation of NATO was a recognition by the Europeans that their
nationalistic rivalries, which helped to cause two world wars, had to be
controlled 10
B. BACKGROUND ON THE WARSAW PACT
The Soviet Union's organization of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May, 1955 was
seen as the result of its failure to break NATO apart. Since it could not
remove American military presence in Europe by force, it tried to remove it
9U.S. Senate, Hearings on the "North Atlantic Treaty," before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-First session,
United States Government Printing Office, 1949, p. 47.
10yost
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by threatening and coaxing the Europeans, especially the Germans. Its means
was the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The pact with the Soviet Union
and all its communist neighbors (initially including Albania) offered nothing
new, however, that had not already been in place since the beginning of the
Cold War. 11
Nikita Khrushchev decided to construct in the Pact a formal
institutionalized vehicle of cooperation for Soviet dominated European
states. "It did not reflect specific military needs and until the early 1960s
performed no function whatsoever; it is even doubtful whether Moscow
takes it seriously."12 The Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization served three
purposes:
It allowed the Soviet Union to claim that its military presence in Eastern
Europe was based on the consent of the East Europeans; it explicitly
assured East European leaders of Soviet military support in case of need;
and it acted as an implicit deterrent against any popular uprising. 13
The major difference between the Warsaw Pact and NATO was in the
ultimate intentions of the superpowers. The Soviet Union imposed itself on
unwilling allies, installing unwanted regimes by force and subversion. The
United States had reluctantly entered into a voluntary alliance. The United
States saw NATO as a pluralistic organization and did not expect a permanent
participation in European defense. Soviet leaders, however, saw Eastern
1"Kaplan, P. 70.
12Jonathan Eyal,"The Warsaw Pact: Does It Have a Future?," European
Security Analyst, February 1990, p. 1.
13Ibid.
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Europe not only as an extension of its own border, but as prelude to the
conquest of the rest of Europe. The Warsaw Pact was as an arm of Soviet
policy. The Brezhnev Doctrine set the rules for the communist bloc:
Without question, the peoples of the socialist countries and the
Communist parties have and must have freedom to determine their
own countries' paths of development. Any decision they make,
however, must not be inimical either to socialism in their own countries
or to the fundamental interests of other socialist countries... The
sovereignty of individual socialist countries cannot be set against the
interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary covenant...
Each Communist party is free to apply the basic principles of Marxism-
Leninism and socialism in its own country, but it is not free to deviate
from these principles... The weakening of any of the links in the world
system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, and they
cannot look indifferently upon this."1 4
Thus, the Warsaw Pact members had little choice but to align with the
Soviet Union. Western Europeans integrated their forces and yielded their
political autonomy because of perceived Soviet expansion. They aligned
because of what the Soviet Union did and continued to do.
C. COEXISTENCE BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT
In the 1960s, the United States' commitment to Vietnam and the rest of
Asia increased and distracted its attention away from Europe. At the same
time, many Europeans desired to decrease the need for U.S. involvement in
their area and minimize the threat of conflict with the Warsaw Pact. Detente
provided an opportunity to allow the U.S. to divert attention from Europe to
'
4 Quoted in Mark Krammer, "Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine,"
International Security, Vol. 14, No. 3, Winter, 1989/90, p. 25, from Sergei
Kovalev, "Suverenitet i internatsional'nye obyazannosti sotsialisticheskikh
stran," Pravda, September 26, 1968, p. 4.
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Asia and provide Europeans a hope for lasting peace and independence. A
Conference on Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) began in October
1973. The signing in August 1975 of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), an agreement of coexistence
between the East and West and final legitimization of Soviet domination
over the Warsaw bloc, was the peak of Detente.
Detente was eventually discredited as a benefit to the East at the expense
of the West. While NATO remained relatively stable in strength, Soviet
power continued to grow into the 1970s. By 1979, President Carter decided on
a dual track approach of military modernization and rebuilding while seeking
arms control at the same time. NATO decided in December 1979 to deploy
intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles while seeking limitation on
the same systems. The Reagan administration used a heavy hand to deal
with the Soviet Union and conducted the largest military build up since
World War II.
The Stockholm accord of September 1986 from the Conference on
Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
(CDE) expanded the confidence-building measures in the 1975 Helsinki Final
Act. In December 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the
INF Treaty which banned all ground-launched intermediate-range missiles
from U.S. and Soviet inventory.
12





















Long range missiles launchers (including both alliance and individual
nation totals)
Belgium 5 Bulgaria 72
France 32 Czech. & GDR 376
Italy 6 Hungary 55
the Neth. 7 Poland 102
West Ger. 76 Rumania 50
U.S. Soviet Union 951
15 Greece and the remaining NATO countries listed are not original
members.
16Albania, an original member, formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact
in September 1968, terminating all official identification with the Soviet bloc.
17New York Times, "The Two Spheres," p. All, 1 December 1989.
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" Intermediate-range missiles
Britain cruise missile 96 Czech. & GDR SS-12: 93
Belgium cruise missile 16 SS-23: 53
Italy cruise missile 96 Soviet Union SS-20: 243
West Ger. cruise missile 48 (162 more in Asia)
Pershing la 72 SS-4: 65
Pershing 2 108 SS-12: 127
SS-23: 114
" Conventional Arms (NATO data18)





Combat aircraft 3,977 7,130
Helicopters 2,419 5,270
* Conventional Forces (Warsaw Pact data)





Combat aircraft 8,250 7,876
Helicopters 3,700 2,785
18 NATO data does not include units in storage or training aircraft.
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D. NATO AND THE ISSUE OF RESPONSIBILITY SHARING
The resounding successful reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan
after World War II may be the most honorable achievement history will
award the United States of America. The United States lifted Western Europe
and Japan from post-war ruin and aided them to the point where today they
are economic powers.
The United States has paid a large price for its commitment. The United
States provided greater than $33.9 billion for the Marshal Plan and post-war
efforts ($184.8 billion in 1989 constant dollars). An estimated annual $160-170
billion (approximately 60 percent) of the U.S. defense budget is committed to
NATO. 19 In 1987, the United States dedicated approximately 6.6 percent of its
gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, while its NATO allies averaged 3.4
percent. 20 This does not fully consider the domestic cost of a large military
presence overseas, nor the opportunity cost of these efforts.
At the same time Europe and Japan were being rebuilt, the United States'
portion of world GNP dropped from approximately 50 to 25 percent. 21 This
point does not mean to follow Professor Paul Kennedy's thesis that the cost of
imperial over-stretching or overextending military power will bring the
downfall of empires (thus, that the U.S. commitment to NATO single-
19 Committee on Armed Services, Interim Report of the Defense
Burdensharing, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988, pp. 2-3.
2 0Christopher C. Bolkcom, NATO Burdensharing: An Analysis of Major




handedly has brought the downfall of the American Empire). Rather, the
point is that while the U.S.'s economic position relative to the rest of the
world has changed, its military role has not.22
The change in circumstance and the perception of inequality of sharing of
the burden caused many in the United States to question why the United
States still desires to contribute significantly more to NATO than all of the
other 15 NATO members combined, and whether a democratic and
increasingly strong economic and politically unified Europe still needs and
desires a large contribution and standing force from the United States. Prior
to the fall of 1989, the defense burden was an issue integral to all Western
security issues. For the Americans, the point of this debate was:
... how to guarantee the economic and military security of the United
States and its allies in the 21st century and ensure that developed
countries with mutual defense interest share the cost of that defense on a
more equitable basis and contribute more equitably to the security,
economic and political well-being of less developed countries. 23
To complicate matters, there is no agreed upon formula to measure the
burden. Indicators, such as GDP or Gross National Product (GNP), do not
consider less quantifiable contributions. In addition, the issue normally has
concentrated on equality and ignored efficiency and has not been properly
2 2The U.S. is involed in five other collective defense arrangements
besides NATO: the ANZUS Treaty, the Philippine Treaty, the Japanese
Treaty, the Republic of Korea Treaty, and the Rio Treaty. The arrangements
involve a Total of 43 other nations.
23Bolkcom, p. 11.
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divided into macro and micro approaches. Despite this fact, the purpose of
NATO has remained relatively constant since its creation.
U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union can be summed in one
word: containment. The containment theory, as stated by its author George
Kennan, argues that the primary source of political power is economic
strength and the largest military threat to peace in the world comes from the
domination of one or a coalition of the five major post-war industrial powers
(China, Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States) over the
others. Kennan's containment theory assumes that a threat to one of the
free-world countries is a threat to the others.
Problems in the containment theory and NATO often derived from
different perception of threat. Due to the allies inability to agree on a
definition of the threat (thus the varying willingness to dedicate resources)
the European countries, Japan, and the United States have had different
strategies to counter it. In sum, national interest is interpreted differently.
This situation has intensified for the allies because of Mikhail Gorbachev,
perestroika, and the amazing resolution of the people behind the former Iron
Curtain. More than any other time since the conception of Containment, the
answer to the question of threat is cloudy. Many, especially Europeans, no
longer see a military threat in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. That is
not to say they do not see a threat. Rather, the threat has changed and, with
the change, many feel there is a need to rethink the concept "containment."
To provide a comprehensive structure that provides for NATO members',
specifically the United States', national security interests in view of the
17
changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Union, an
analysis of the impact of these recent changes is necessary.
18
Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE
SOVIET UNION
A. INTRODUCTION
European Marxists had reassured themselves that it was they with whom
history had sided in the evolution of economic and political systems. The
industrial revolution was to have produced political and social revolution.
In this process, Marxists envisioned workers turning into socialists who
would then harness their power for social good. Through Leninist and
Marxist philosophy, communists found the vehicle to take and then
maintain control over conquered Eastern European and Russian regimes.
However, after more than seven decades, the communists had failed to
deliver the promise which Marx had guaranteed.
In the USSR up to the tenure of Khrushchev, the Soviet communist
system provided a sense of stability and order that allowed a measure of
success. Soviet citizens endured the continued sacrifice during this period
because they had no choice under severe state control. They were also
influenced by Soviet propaganda which belittled Western capitalism for its
record of roller coaster successes and depression and its acceptance of
unemployment. Soviet propaganda was also able to use people's fear of the
remaining pockets of fascism to repress discontent.
By the 1970s however, the Soviet Union began to show signs of economic
and social deterioration. Citizens began to show signs of major discontent
over food and other consumer product shortages. Many did not remember
19
the hardship of pre-communism; they only knew of the hardship within
communism. Compounding the growing general discontent was the
growing dissident movement and refuseniks and the isolation of the aging
leaders from average citizens. Only the enthusiasm of the converts in the
Third World and continued military confrontations with the West provided
the Soviet ideology with a raison d'etre.24
Of course there are many examples showing that the people of Eastern
Europe never had faith in the totalitarian system imposed upon them. The
revolutions in Hungary in the autumn of 1956 and Czechoslovakia in the
spring and summer 1968 revealed the extent that Eastern Europeans never
internalized the Soviet system as their own.
Schopflin argues that the final communist system practiced in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe had "next to nothing in common with socialism
as this was defined in the West."25 The communist regimes did not replace
capitalism with social justice, equality, citizen based decision-making and
shared productivity but with state control. The communists used politics for
an ideological goal, subjugating all other spheres of society (economy, social,
etc.,) in its attempt to construct a new society.2 6
This communist system for government is comparable to the
"Metternich System" imposed on central Europe after the Napoleonic wars.
24Michael Howard, "The Springtime of Nations," Foreign Affairs, pp. 17-
32, v. 69, no. 1, 1990, pp. 18-19.
25 George Schopflin, "The End of Communism in Eastern Europe,"
International Affairs, pp. 3-16, v. 66, no. 1, January 1990, p. 3-4.
26 lbid, p. 4.
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Austrian Prince Klemens von Metternich also despised liberal concepts of
popular elections and had faith only in reactionary autocratic governments.
The Metternich System used rigid censorship, manipulation, repressive
measures, elaborate espionage and surveillance, to suppress the ideals of
constitutional rule and nationalist aspirations that were prevalent during and
after the Napoleonic wars.27
One may then assume 1848 returned in 1989, only this time, it was the
communists who were the old regimes. Instead of achieving its goal of
producing the "socialist man," communist state-control regimes produced
citizens convinced of this system's bankruptcy.
History is not merely cycling through; 1989 is not 1848. The
revolutionists in 1848 were more politically naive and less aware of the
problems that lay ahead. The 1848 revolutior" -J not have leaders with the
strength of Lech Walesa, Vaclav Hazel and Mikhail Gorbachev. The 1848
revolutionary coalitions proved to be less complete and fell apart quickly.
Hopefully, the final difference will be that, unlike 1848, the revolutions of
1989 will succeed.
Howard argues that one lesson of 1848 in Europe (and 1789 in France), is
that during extended periods of peace, (1763 to 1789, 1815 to 1848 and 1945 to
1989) economic and social development become especially important factors
in politics. If those who govern do not respond to the citizens' sensitivity of
27William L. Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of World History, Houghton
Mifflin, 1972, p. 717 & 718.
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these factors, "they will sooner or later be swept away."28 It is ironic that one
of the best explanations of this process was from Karl Marx.
Schroeder states that the lesson to learn from 1848 is in the manner other
countries responded to the Austrian Empire, where the revolutionary
movement started. After the revolution took hold and democracy was
emerging in the Austrian Empire, the rest of Europe tended to ignore
Austria's problems associated with its transition from a monarchy to self-
determining constitutional states. Many other Europeans saw Austria's
problems as a blessing; a weak Austria would not interfere with the success of
the other revolutions. What passed for diplomacy toward Austria in 1848
was "Micawberism," the doctrine of muddling through, hoping solutions
would appear. Ultimately, it was the lack of recognition of a natural
connection between the countries in Europe that proved fatal and ended the
revolutions of 1848.29
Yesterday's Austria in its influence in Europe is today's Soviet Union as
the center of revolutionary events. The differences in the two powers greatly
outweigh the similarities. However, taking the fate of Austria in the later
half of the 19th century, it is reasonable to ask if the West is again using
Micawberite diplomacy. Though 1989 was not 1848, the reason to refer back to
28Howard, p.18.
29Paul Shroeder, "1848 and 1989: The Perils and Profits of Historical
Comparisons," papcr presented at the "Helsinki II and the Future of Europe
Conference", Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1990, p.
1-12.
22
history in this case is not to look for a "usable past" but an "unusable
future. "30
"If 1989 was the year of sweeping away, 1990 must become the year of
building anew. '31 The emerging democracies in East and Central Europe are
now attempting to rebuild their societies from the rubble left by the former
regimes. There are three basic goals the new countries will try to meet:
Establishing new democratic political systems, arranging new security, and
reforming their economies.
B. BASIC GOALS OF THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES IN EAST EUROPE
In order to endure, the revolutionaries must respond to the peoples'
demands for political democracy through fair and free elections that establish
open governments. The new system must ensure continued respect for the
individual's fundamental rights and liberties. "Governments based on the
consent of the governed are the first requirement for an enduring peace in
Europe."32 The revolution must move from rhetoric in the streets to that c5
governing.
30Ibid, pp. 3-4.
3 1James A. Baker, "Imperatives of Economic Reform: Change in Soviet
and East European Economies," prepared statement before the U.S. House of
Representatives House Ways and Means Committee, Washington, D.C.,18
April 1990, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Current Policy no. 1270, p. 7.
32james A. Baker, "From Revolution to Democracy: Central and Eastern
Europe in the New Europe," prepared address at Charles University, Prague,
Czechoslovakia, 7 February 1990, United States Department of State, Bureau
of Public Affairs, Current Policy no. 1248, p. 2 .
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The Communist regimes never learned that security through a
government accountable to the people's will is a stronger weapon than
repression and violence. Soviet President Gorbachev seems to have
understood the need for people to feel that their government was accountable
to them for some time and there is evidence he stressed this in discussions
with the other leaders in the Warsaw Pact. At the annual Warsaw pact
summit in Bucharest on 7 July 1989, for example, Gorbachev asked his allies
to be tolerant of reforms and to search for solutions based on their countries
individual needs.33
So far, the German Democratic Republic and Hungary have held what are
considered by most Western nations, including the United States, fair and
free elections. By June 1990, when Hungary forms its new government, the
GDR and Hungary will have coalition governments controlled by
noncommunists. Only in Romania did conservatives brake the string of
victories for the revolutionaries. Former communists remain in power in
that country after the victory in the May 1990 election of the National
Salvation Front. The National Salvation front is dominated by former
communists and has run the country since the fall of Ceausescu. Although
the United States delegation monitoring the election proclaimed the
Romanian elections valid, there remains doubt about how much
intimidation the citizens were under. Parliamentary and local election have




The second goal for the emerging democracies will be to provide for
enduring security. Previously Eastern European regimes depended on
assistance from the Soviet military for their nations' external security while
they personally maintained large national internal security forces to control
their citizens. Today, however, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)
nations largely do not desire dependence on the Soviet Union for external
security and are either eliminating or reforming their formerly dreaded
internal Security forces. All of the former satellites with Soviet troops within
their boarders, with the exception of Poland, have begun negotiations for
Soviet troop withdraw. With Soviet troops gone from Eastern Europe and
uncertainties remaining in those countries (ethnic unrest, questions on
Germany, etc.) a new Europe will have to construct new security
arrangements that remove the threat of military aggression and intimidation,
and nurtures peace. Military arrangements must keep up with political
changes, and legitimate governments through free and open elections will
reinforce the new security arrangements.
The third goal is the most important: dismantling the centralized
Communist economies in Eastern Europe and moving toward market-based
economies. Measures to promote economic vitality are necessary to avoid
instability. This goal may prove to be the most trying for the people of East
Europe; they face the task of regenerating societies ruined by half a century of
totalitarian rule. Involved in the economic regeneration is environmental
regeneration, also damaged by the mismanagement of central planners.
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C. FACTORS COMPLICATING THE TRANSITION
Implementation of the goals presented may be broken down into short,
mid and long range criteria. Regardless, the path to the goals will be difficult.
Implementation of the three goals will be complicated by five factors: The
dual political-economic aspect of the transition, popular expectations, lack of
democratic tradition, relations with ethnic-minorities, and economic
development problems.34
The East European countries will have to simultaneously change their
political and economic systems. This is unprecedented in modern times.
After World War II, the Western European countries may have had to
rebuild destroyed economies; however, they had the basic talents to manage
an economic recovery. Even in modern day Latin America, the political
systems matured prior to developing market-based economies. 35 The
emerging Eastern European democracies, however, will have to make
political and economic changes jointly. The lack of experience in both
running democratically elected governments and market-based economies
makes the achievement of any of the goals very difficult.
The new governments, while building modern democracies, will have to
cope with public opinion. Public opinion in East and Central Europe appears
34 Stephen F. Larrabee, Distinguished Scholar, Institute for East-West
Security Studies, New York, "Democratization and Change in Eastern
Europe," paper presented at the "Helsinki II and the Future of Europe
Conference", Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1990,
pp. 1-8.
35 lbid, p. 1.
26
to expect a great deal of change in their standards of living quickly. The
public's attitude, now that totalitarianism is dead, that their lives will
improve significantly, is unrealistic in the short range. Having spent over 40
years sacrificing and still having a lower standard of living than the rest of
Europe, Eastern Europeans do not appear willing to give the new
governments a honeymoon period.
True economic reforms will require that people, coddled in socialism all
their lives, will have to face the realities involved in a market economy.
Therefore, unproductive factories will have to close, people in unproductive
jobs will have to find new ones, and prices will go up. The people of Eastern
Europe may not be prepared to risk the low prices and guaranteed jobs that
state-controlled economy provides for the opportunities of a market-based
economy.
"The gap between rising popular expectations and declining living
standards will pose a severe test for fragile democratic governments with
little experience in dealing with the vagaries of the market."36 The paradox is
that political sensitivity on the part of elected officials to public demand of
immediate gratification endangers long-range recovery. However, if the
leaders fail to meet public expectations they will lose the support needed to
remain legitimate, which raises the risk of popular unrest.
The East German situation, in terms of ability to meet immediate
gratification, is different from the rest of the WTO nations. East Germany
will not need to rebuild a new government, but will eventually be
36Ibid, p. 2.
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incorporated into wealthy West Germany. Still, elected officials in the united
Germany will be dealing, not only with East Germans' expectations, but with
West Germans' concerns. Even with the Marshall Plan and skilled
politicians such as Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhardt, it still took West
Germany approximately 10 years to reach a convertible currency after World
War II. Yet, East Germans, seem to expect quick relief from their inferior
living standards. Based on the election results of March 1990, the East
Germans perceived that the Christian Democrats were more likely to conduct
German reunification quicker (thus, in their eyes, providing a better living
standard) than the Social Democrats. However, the Christian Democrats,
being more politically conservative than the liberal Social Democrats, also are
less likely to ensure that the cradle-to-grave welfare benefits, such as full
medical care, inexpensive housing and secure pensions will be preserved in a
united Germany. At the same time, West Germans will have a growing
concern that, while reunification may provide the immediate gratification for
East Germans, it will be at West Germans' expense.
The third problem facing all the emerging democracies is the lack of a
democratic tradition. Between World War I and II, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Poland and Romania were under authoritarian rule. The democracies that
sprung up after World War 1I were quickly destroyed by Communists.
Czechoslovakia has the longest tradition of democracy of all the WTO
nations, yet it was still suppressed by the communists. Having existed under
the domination of the Soviet-type system, the democratic process is largely
unknown by most in East and Central Europe.
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The Soviet-type system was based on the elimination of political and
economic alternatives in society. Especially during the Stalinist period, there
was massive uprooting and elimination of the interwoven network of social
groups (judicial, managerial, educators, etc.) needed for a thriving society.
Rewards in this society were based on allegiance to ideology, not on
productivity. Ultimately, this homogeneity of thought imposed by the system
and the subjugation of all spheres in society into the political sphere
destroyed their citizens' perceptions of what constitutes national interests.
"To undo the effects of this [the communist system] and to create conditions
for the recognition of interests will take time and will require particular
mechanisms. ,37
The strongest example of recovery to these problems is found in Poland
and Hungary. Solidarity in Poland has been a strong organization for several
years with grass roots legitimacy and recognized leaders. Total support may
be difficult to continue now that Solidarity has moved from being a
movement to a political party in power, having to compete with other
parties. Yet, Poles still identify their successes with Solidarity and, therefore,
will more than likely provide the government the benefit of the doubt as it
transforms. With the support of the Catholic Church, Solidarity has
established itself as the voice of the Poland.38
Hungary has had a recent history of allowing organizations of dissent




criticism, especially from intellectuals, within the Hungarian Socialist
Worker's (Communist) Party (HSWP). By May 1988, party members were
largely dissatisfied with HSWP General Secretary Janos Kadar because he
refused to acknowledged that Hungary was in the midst of a crisis and the
need for drastic reform. On 24 June, the HSWP Central Committee
established a 4-member collective Presidium headed by reformist Minister of
State Rezso Nyers. By the autumn of 1988, politicians with even more
reforms in mind began to move to fill the political vacuum being created and
the Hungarian Communist Party met competition. By the time the
Communist Party dissolved, radical factions already had some governing
experience. 39
In Bulgaria, although President and Party Chairman Todor I. Zhivkov
(the longest serving Communist-bloc leader) was deposed in November 1989
and replaced by moderate communist, Petar T. Mladenov as President, it
remains to be seen if the Communist Party is truly willing to allow a
democratic process. The current government of former communist won the
first round of the parliamentary and local elections on 10 June (runoff
elections are scheduled for 17 June). Major concerns for future elections
relate to equal access for opposition groups to the media, dismissal of
opposition activists from state employment and election related secret police
activities. 40
39Schopflin, p. 7-8.
40Baker, "Imperatives of Economic Reform: Change in Soviet and East
European Economies," p. 7.
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Romania recently showed that opening the political environment
without establishing democratic institutions and principles can result in a
resurgence of historic ethnic animosities. Romanians and ethnic Hungarians
have killed each other over the issue of minority rights.41
The fourth equally important problem is that of the ethnic-minority
problems all the countries face, except Poland. Eastern and Central Europe
has a long history of ethnic nationalism and animosities. Most ethnic
minorities in Central and Eastern Europe resent the majority because of a
perceived unbalanced distribution of wealth and power or cultural
repression. In addition, most ethnic minorities maintain strong cultural
bonds. Therefore, East and Central Europe never experience a melting pot
affect which many claim uccurred in the United States. Since the Soviet-type
system suppress,- '1 spheres of society, ethnic-minority frustrations were
suppressed but not resolved. With the opening of the societies reemerges
minority demands. The problems with Turks in Bulgaria, Slovaks in
Czechoslovakia, Hungarians in Romania have proven to be the most
votatile. Gorbachev's Glasnost has proven that as the disaffected minorities
are allowed to express their grievances and aspirations and as the majority
reacts, governments run a great risk of insecurity.
Czechoslovakia is an example where ethnic problems run the risk of
sabotaging the democratic future of East and Central Europe. In what began as
a routine legislative move in April to drop the official name of
Czechoslovakia, triggered a resurgence of Slovak nationalism. Czech
41Ibid.
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legislators wanted Czechoslovak Federal Republic as the new name; Slovaks
wanted it to be Czech-Slovak Republic, insisting on the hyphen to emphasize
the separate and distinct status of their region. The final compromise, a
hyphen in Slovakia and no hyphen in the Czech territories, sparked mass
demonstrations in the Slovak capital of Bratislava. Many Slovaks are now
demanding total autonomy. 42
Solutions to the ethnic problems are hard to determine and even harder
to carry out. The problems are hard to determine since some of them are
based purely on ignorance or prejudice. Just as in the United States, a means
of combating prejudice may be via, political, judicial and educational
channels. Since most of the animosities have been existence decades or even
centuries, it will be difficult to get minorities and the majorities to agreed on
long-held grievances. The first steps to carrying out unity seems to be to
include all groups in each Eastern European country's democratizing process.
At the same time, economic reforms should be set to benefit all in society.
Animosities may only increase if the economic transitions are seen to benefit
only majority groups at the expense of ethnic minorities. Greater autonomy,
for example in the case of Czechoslovakia, may be part of the solution and a
direct extension of the democratizing process.
Complicating all other problems facing East and Central Europe is their
devastated economies. As stated earlier, subjugation of the economies under
politics resulted in economic decisions based on political criteria.
42 Jonathan C. Randal, "Prague Name-Changing Feud Stirs Slovak
Nationalism," The Washington Post, 5 April 1990, A30.
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Soviet-type economies were, in the final analysis, concerned not with
matching supply and demand, but with administering inputs and
outputs; in other words, the economy was detached from the consumer
and producer, and non-economic criteria were frequently used to distort
economic rationality.43
Thus, state planning leaned toward a simplified industrial structure
making Eastern Europe less and less competitive with the world market.
Although desire to dismantle the centralized Communist economic
system can be found throughout all the emerging democracies in Eastern
Europe, the attributes of socialism of life-long employment security and equal
incomes across most of society retain strong support. 4 4 The Poles and
Hungarians have gone the furthest in giving up the notion of equality for all
and have paved the way for other WTO nations to achieve a market-based
economy.
As a whole, since the 1980s, the national economies of the Warsaw Pact
countries grew at an average rate of one percent a year, or less than one-third
the rate for East Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. As a whole, Eastern Europe
produces 5.8 percent of the world GNP of $18.65 trillion, while the Soviet
Union 13.6 percent, Western Europe 21.8 percent, and the United States 26.1
percent.
Each country has differed in response to the objective of economic
reform. Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia appear to be headed to




not yet abandoned most government planning as the principle means of
allocating resources.
Poland's Solidarity-led government has begun a dynamic economic
program and has gone the furthest in forming a free market. The Western
media is calling Poland's process to capitalism the "cold turkey" or "shock
therapy" approach. Selling of state-controlled enterprises has begun, with
those unable to attract buyers facing the possibility of closure. As of 1 January,
the Polish Government ended price controls and subsidies. Poland is already
experiencing growing pains in this quick transition process. Unemployment
may reach five percent by the end of the year and there are growing disparities
in income. Layoffs are becoming legal and price controls are being
eliminated. Poland's inflation rate has increase to over 50 percent a month.
Industrial production fell in February by nearly 30 percent compared to a year
ago. Real income has plunged 37 percent. The Polish government estimated
that prices rose 24 percent in February, after rising 78 percent in January. -5
Foreign aid investment from West Europe, Japan and the United States
will hopefully help in controlling the downward cycle, produce results and
avoid social unrest. Poles appear to still support the government's bold
initiative, but there are growing signs of concern from all segments of
society.46
45Blaine Harden, "Poland Hit by Severe Recession," The Washington
Post, 17 March 1990, Al.
46Ibid.
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Hungary has had more of a tradition of entrepreneurialism than the
other East European countries; It began to adopt market-based policies in the
1980s. Today 25 percent of Hungary's economy is in the hands of the private
sector and it has a form of a stock market. Selling off the remainder of the
state enterprises does not have the same urgencies as in Poland and the
Government has attempted to simulate market-based conditions in the state-
controlled enterprises. Hungary has, so far, stuck with the economic reform
program devised by the transitional government under Premier Nemeth
which slashed the deficit by cutting producer and consumer subsides,
trimming defense expenditures and raised rent and taxes.
An example of simulating market conditions in state-controlled
enterprises in Hungary is that managers are employee elected (to simulate
shareholders). Many managers today bargain production targets, price levels,
capital investment and material purchases with the Government. Profit-
seeking cooperatives with autonomy to market their own goods have sprung
up throughout the country. Hungarian citizens are allowed to form private
companies (with no more than 500 employees), with limitations. Hungary
has sought out Western companies as joint venture partners and has even
sold state enterprises to foreign companies or to Hungarian managers (similar
to Capitalist-type leveraged buy-outs). However, financing remains a very
large obstacle to privatizations. The banks are still controlled by the
government; thus bureaucrats, not bankers decide who get the loans. A
significant stumbling block is that most money goes to pay off Hungary's
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foreign debt of close to $20 billion foreign debt, the largest debt in the Eastern
bloc. 47
East Germany, with a population of approximately 17 million is the
wealthiest Warsaw Pact nation with a comparatively well-educated and
disciplined workers. Its special relationship with West Germany (population
over 57 million) provides a dedicated mentor on its path to economic
recovery. Most state-run enterprises fail to provide sufficient profit and
require significant subsidies. This led to a $70 billion budget deficit in 1988.
Investment was sharply cut in the 1980s to preserve cash needed partially to
pay back the $20 billion foreign debt.48 West Germany businesses, already the
leading trading partner with previously communist-run Europe, are coming
into East Germany in large numbers hoping to build factories, form joint
ventures and market products in East Germany.
There will be much competition within West Germany and the world to
participate in East Germans' recovery. In addition, "Most of the factories are
old, with outmoded equipment, and they're not able to produce competitive
goods. Many of these factories will have to be rebuilt from the ground up."49
Massive foreign capital investment is expected to flow into East Germany
in the 1990s. Low wages for a skilled and disciplined force make investment
attractive. In addition, East Germany is seen by many businesses as the
47Louis Uchitelle, "East Europe Ties Mild Capitalism," The New York
Times, 11 December 1989, p. C6.
48Ibid.
49Steven Greenhouse, "German Businesses Racing toward Unity," The
New York Times, 15 March 1990, p. Cl.
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window to the Eastern Bloc and can serve as a training ground for businesses
wanting to do business with the emerging democracies. Plans for unification
with West Germany ultimately makes investment into East Germany
attractive.
Public opinion in Czechoslovakia on economic reform foretells the
problems facing economic recovery. According to a poll taken shortly after
the the overthrow of the Communist regime, 47 percent of Czechoslovaks
wanted their economy to remain state controlled. Only three percent wanted
capitalism. 50
Fortunately for Czechoslovakia, inflation is not as big a problem as in the
rest of Eastern Europe. However, unemployment may prove to be a problem
if Czechoslovakia makes the step to market-based economy. Most of the work
force is employed in industry which, like the rest of East Europe, has fallen
behind in technology and competitiveness.
Bulgaria's and Romania's economies are the worst of the Warsaw Pact
nations. Prospects of economic reforms are also more problematic because of
former Communists largely remaining in control of the economy. Central
planning is still the practice in Bulgaria. Romania's economy was completely
devastated by the Ceausescu regime. The regime repaid the entire $10 billion
foreign debt at the expense of causing the country to literally go bankrupt and
force severe food rations.
Analyzing the developments and problems of each country in the




and distinct. Prior to World War II, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia
were considered part of Central Europe. Romania and Bulgaria, on the other
hand, had been viewed as a part of the Balkans and not integral parts of
Europe.
Larabee claims that in the 1990s, these historical differentiations will
return. Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia are expected to complete the
transition to democracy and return to Europe proper. These countries will
have the closest ties with the rest of Europe via the European Community
(EC) and other established Western institutions. In the long-range, it is not
far-fetched to expect these three countries to be a part of the EC and European
parliament.
The Balkan states present a problem. Romania and Bulgaria run the
highest risk of political and economic instability, which may result in social
instability. It is also in these states that the ethnic minority problems are
worst. This instability in the Balkans threatens its neighbors.
D. POLITICAL FUTURE OF EASTERN EUROPE
The Director of Central Intelligence, William H. Webster, acknowledges
the changes in Eastern Europe are irreversible. "Perhaps most important,
there is little chance that Soviet Hegemony could be restored in Eastern
Europe."'51 It appears that the reactionary forces generally appear too weak and
discredited to regain power in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and
5 1William H. Webster, Statement by the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency Before the Armed Services Committee, House of
Representatives, 1 March 1990, p. 2.
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Poland. In these countries, the armed forces and secret police have become
unreliable as instruments of repression.
The prospects for democracy are more uncertain for the Balkan states of
Bulgaria and Romania. In these countries, democracy has had few
antecedents, economic and ethnic tensions are severe, and former
communists from the old regimes remain in power. Reform setbacks may
occur in the emerging democracies.
The revolutions of 1989 have undermined the cold war severely. They
have severely weakened the the appeal of international communism as a
political force. There is now a determined move toward political, economic
and social integration with West Europe, especially in Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland. East Germany will almost certainly become a part of
Western Europe when it eventually unites with West Germany. However,
the overthrow of tyranny and desire to integrate with the rest of Europe does
not guarantee the establishment of a stable and democratic condition.
Another factor to consider for all but East Germany (due to being
integrated into West Germany) is the role the armies will play in the new
government. The armies previously were an integral part of the party and
controlled the security agenda for each country, under the guidance of the
Soviet Union. As the result of the loss of long-standing stature and prestige
within the governments, no longer remaining a priority for resources, and
the loss of the shield from the publics' doubts about its value, the armies
response to change is still uncertain.
Poland and Hungary are certainly on the road to a full market-based
economy. Regardless of the intentions of the of policy makers however, it
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appears that full privatization may go slowly in most of East Europe. Brada
states that there is an imbalance between capital stock and liquid savings in
these countries. In addition, the domestic financial systems in most of East
Europe are not capable of financing purchases of state-controlled properties.
Hungary may be an exception. Small privately owned businesses have the
potential of flourishing but public services (communications, transportation,
energy) will likely be retained by the state.52
Reformers are hesitant to completely free prices and wages for fear of
creating excessive inflation and unacceptable levels of unemployment. Of
course they must be sensitive to public expectations; however, if the market is
not allowed to set the standards for price and wage, information distortion
will occur. Thus, the the East European market will not be provided the best
information for recovery.
An important requirement for the complete success of the economic
transformation will be the establishment of capital markets. The conversion
of centrally-controlled enterprises will not in itself guarantee the creation of
efficient equity or credit markets. Brada claims that, more likely, the new
joint stock enterprises will be closely held in large blocs. If that is the case,
valuing the shares of the emerging companies through an efficient equities
market will have the similar problems experienced in market economies
52josef C. Brada, Department of Economics, Arizona State University,
"West European Economic Integration and East European Disintegration:
Managing the Transition to a New Phase of European Economic Relations,"
paper presented at the "Helsinki 1I and the Future of Europe Conference",
Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1990, pp. 3-4.
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where the stock value of closely held firms (for example family owned firms)
must be determined. Therefore, Brada predicts:
Even in the most reform minded of the economies of Eastern Europe,
the role of the state as an allocator of resources, and especially of
investment resources, as well as owner of industrial enterprises will
remain an important if not dominant feature of the economic
mechanism. At the same time market generated signals will be weak,
contain much noise, and will also be subject to considerable
misinterpretation by economies unaccustomed to functioning in a
market environment. 53
E. COMECON AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
The main instrument of Soviet economic imperialism in Eastern Europe
was the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) whose
principle of "internationalist socialist division of labor" was an attempt to
coordinate communist-bloc nations' economies. 54 As the Warsaw Pact
countries turn their back on the Soviet-style economies, they face a problem
of how to transition their economies away from COMECON. Currently,
between 40 and 80 percent of the Warsaw Pact nations' trade is within
COMECON. If COMECON is disbanded, redirection of trade will be difficult
and expensive in the short-range.
Another consideration is that Warsaw Pact countries are dependent on
subsidized energy from the Soviet Union and pay for it with currency that is
not convertible into market-based currencies. If for no other reason than to
53Ibid, p. 5.
54Langer, p. 1167-1168, & 1204.
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continue the trade of energy, COMECON will continue to exist in the mid-
range.
The first steps in long-range solutions to the devastated economies
occurred at the 46th COMECON session in December 1989. The members
agreed to begin trading in convertible currencies in 1991. Many of the
members felt this was largely at the Soviets' advantage since they were the
exporters of energy. Since the trade of energy will be conducted at convertible
currency, there will be pressure to discontinue the subsidizing by the Soviets
and energy prices are expected to rise considerably. Therefore, East European
countries are expected to start running a large trade deficit with the Soviet
Union after 1991 if a means to ease the transition is not found.
One possible transition methods could be the Soviets allowing a grace
period in ending the subsidization of energy or consider the deficit is
considered aid. Considering the Soviets' own economic deterioration,
however, Gorbachev may push for western aid to assist the East European
countries as the primary transition method. Possibly in reference to this
situation, Czechoslovak president Vaclav Havel stated, in front of a joint
session of the United States Congress on 21 February 1991, the best way the
United States could help his country was to help the Soviet Union. 55
A long-range alternative to COMECON is "subregional cooperation." 5 6
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and the GDR have discussed a Central
5 5 The New York Times, "Excepts From Czech Chief's Address to
Congress," 22 February 1990, A8.
56Larabee, p. 6.
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European Economic Federation. Hungary, Italy, Yugoslavia and Austria met
in November to discuss economic cooperation within their region.
Most East European leaders seem to see the long-range answer to solving
their enormous economic problems is involvement in the EC. Poland,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia have already signed trade agreements with the
EC. Of course East Europe's desire to participate in the EC gives West Europe
more problems which will be discussed later.
It is clear now that the democratizing process in the European
Communist Bloc occurred with the support of the Gorbachev. President
Gorbachev recommended the Communist leaders in Poland to start talks
with Solidarity. He also warned East Germany's Honecker and
Czechoslovakia's Jakes of the consequences of resisting the reform
movement. It also was Gorbachev who first advised Krenz to open East
Germany's borders. In the the end, the finest assistance the Soviet Union
provided the people of East Europe was to keep its troops in their barracks and
to renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine. Gorbachev's support for
democratization eventually ended at the Baltics. The changes in East Europe
are undoubtedly important, but, the most important changes have occurred
in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, more than any other individual in these
times, is the one changing the world.
F. ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION
President Gorbachev's initiation of perestroika, political and economic
restructuring, glasnost, increased openness, and novoe mishlenie, new
thinking have proven to be a true revolution. The changes Gorbachev has
sought in the Soviet structure are:
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" A presidency with wide-ranging powers;
" A Supreme Soviet that would enact laws and decrees much like the U.S.
Congress;
• A Politburo and Central Committee that would agree to radical reforms;
* A bureaucracy that would implement, rather than obstruct, reform; and
* Public opinion support of the necessary changes
Reasons for perestroika developed before Gorbachev came to power.
State-control appeared to industrialize the Soviet Union quickly after World
War II, albeit at great human cost. By the 1970s, though, the Soviets identified
fundamental problems in their economy. President Yuri Andropov began
the reform which was passed on to Gorbachev. A combination of five factors
have caused perestroika: A sharp drop in the economic growth, the declining
position of the Soviet Union in the world economy, the military burden of
the economic failure, the emergence of growing public dissatisfaction, and the
emergence of a new leadership. 57
The growth rate of the Soviet economy fell from five percent in the late
1960s to 1.8 percent in the late 1980s. MccGwire states the primary reason for
the drop in the growth rate was the Soviets' inability to move from
"extensive" to "intensive" development. Extensive development achieves
growth through increasing input volume to production, such as raw
material, labor, and capital. Intensive development achieves growth by
increasing the productivity instead of the volume of the different factors of
production. Extensive development, which was successfully relied upon for
20 years after World War II, no longer was successful because the factors
57Baker, "Imperatives of Economic Reform: Change in Soviet and East
European Economies," p. 2.
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which make up the volume to production, especially labor, had reached its
limit. However, the Soviets had not moved on to intensive development.
Thus, economists determined that far too much effort had been place on
expanding the economic base and not enough on continually modernizing.58
Instead of catching up and surpassing the economies of the West, as
Marxist-Leninist ideology boasted, the Soviet economy, fell further behind
the developed Western economies after World War II. Even emerging
industrial nations, such as those in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc.,)
surpassed The Soviet Unions' ability to progress. The Soviets' international
trading position became in jeopardy. By the 1980s, in fact, the Soviets began
relying more and more on the export of raw materials and products from
Eastern Europe. 59
Prior to Gorbachev, the Soviet Union placed a high priority on military
power and relied on this power to influence foreign policy. The cost of Soviet
military power grew rapidly in the 1970s and Soviet leaders did not hesitate to
siphon off an even greater share of civilian resources. As the economy fell,
the military burden grew. In fact, the growing burden was damaging the
economy's ability to recover. Military expenditure grew from 12 to 14 percent
58Michael MccGwire, "Perestroika and Soviet National Security - VII:
Gorbachev Assumes Command, 1987-88," paper presented to the Brookings
Institute, December 1989, p. 4.
59Baker, "Imperatives of Economic Reform: Change in Soviet and East
European Economies," p. 2.
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of the gross national product (GNP) in 1970 to 15-17 percent by 1985.60 Because
the economy was slipping, growth in Soviet military technology also fell
further behind the West and reduced military capabilities.
Communist propaganda had always claimed that the party gained its
legitimacy over the Soviet people via historical destiny and from the
proposition that it was the legacy of the communist revolution. In addition
the party argued that it was the most logical and efficient force in society,
representing the finest elements of the the progressive tradition. By the mid-
1970s, public confidence in the communist political-economic system was
nearly gone.
The working class, moderately secure with the minimal universal
welfare safety net, developed a minimum effort for minimum reward ethos.
The black marketers became essential for the functioning of the official
economy. Finally, stubborn, unrepentant groups of dissidents made demands
against the government. Exile and repression of the dissidents, some of
Soviet Unions' best talent, created heroes for the ordinary citizens and sapped
much creativity out of the official society. Culture was driven underground
or abroad. People were left with only an awareness of the repressiveness of
life. 61
60Figures come from CIA reports to the Joint Economic Committee, U.S.
Congress, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China, 1986 , U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 15. Figures on Soviet military portion of
USSR GNP are highly speculative since Soviets do not distribute exact figures
and very controversial.
6 1Z, "To the Stalin Mausoleum, Daedalus, p. 295-344, v. 119, no. 1, Winter
1990, p.321.
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At the height of Soviet international power, in the 1970s and early 1980s,
the Kremlin was controlled by old men, stuck in ideological malaise and
isolated from the people. Even before going beyond Andropov's scheme to
reform the Soviet Union, Gorbachev replaced the corrupt bureaucrats of the
Brezhnev era and succeeded in controlling the old militarist of the Red
Army. He attempted to replace old bureaucrats with communists who
understood that the Soviet engine required more that minor adjustments.
President Andropov initiated the perestroika process by implementing
the shift from extensive to intensive development. The key difference with
Andropov's economic reform from all other previous Soviet attempts was
that he encouraged discussion and debate about the economy. He also
attempted to combat economic inefficiency by attacking mismanagement and
corruption. The GDR and its perceived economic efficiency was looked at as a
communist model of the future. After his death, the coalition he organized,
which included Gorbachev as its most prominent member, continued with
the effort during Chernenko's reign.
When Gorbachev initiated perestroika after being elected General
Secretary in 1985, he intended it to be a controlled economic reform directed
from above.62 It had a limited purpose of substantive economic development
through prioritizing industrial modernization. This industrial
modernization required the most advanced technology for all sectors of the
economy. The economic redevelopment would also focus on the investment
in equipment and machine tools. Included in his reform formula was a total
62Ibid, p. 322-323.
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regeneration of worker-discipline, emphasizing an anti-alcohol campaign,
and a push for organizational quality-control and bureaucratic 7T,-cipline
throughout the economy. A major purpose of glasnost was to expose
bureaucratic and managerial incompetence. Gorbachev's perestroika
program also established higher growth targets. Finally, new decrees were
established on wages and social benefits to deal with wage leveling and the
lost link between performance and income.63
The economy continued to stagnate by the end of 1986. In fact, economic
planning based on higher but unrealized goals exacerbated imbalances and
the extra investment proved useless without the market signals of prices and
profits to provide direction for the allocation of capital. Gorbachev realized
that his bureaucracy only paid lip-service to quality-control primarily because
it interfered with meeting targets which provided bonuses. There was
widespread public skepticism and distrust of the economic reforms.
It appears that in the summer of 1986 Gorbachev realized that more
drastic action was necessary if he was to reverse the downward path of thU
economy. He especially was concerned with the public inertia toward
economic reform and determined that the key to perestroika's success was to
get his citizens to internalize the process. Gorbachev made a parable of the
solution in January 1987, "a house can be put in order only by a person who
feels he owns the house."64 It was at this point Gorbachev started moving
63Baker, "Imperatives of Economic Reform: Change in Soviet and East
European Economies," p. 3.
64Quoted from Tass, 27 January 1987, n FBIS-87-018, p., R17, in MccGwire.
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beyond the plan initiated by Andropov. His solution was to democratize the
perestroika process. Gorbachev told the people of Krasnodar on 18 September
1986, "the essence of perestroika ... is for people to feel they are the country's
master."65 Gorbachev depended on democratization to force attention to
correct procedures and improve efficiency.
Still, democratization was not seen as the onl-, key to perestroika's
success. A major shift of resources from defense to the Livilian economy was
necessary. Thus, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is believed to have
been perestroika induced. The January 1987 Party plenum was the turning
point for the democratization of perestroika. It also resulted in the
promulgation of the classified decision that the "military should develop
plans based on the doctrinal assumption that world war could and would be
averted by political means."66
By 1989, the some Soviet reformers recognized the only way to save the
Soviet Union from economic collapse was to turn to -. market-based
economy. They realized that only through the market would efficiency be
achieved. Yet, the reformers failed to get the programs through the status
quo.6 7
The Soviet Union is still trying in 1990 to find a middle ground between
complete reforms, leading to a market economy, and command planning.
65Quoted from Pravda, 20 September 1986, in MccGwire.
66MccGwire, p. 11.
67 Baker, "Imperatives of Economic Reform: Change in Soviet and East
European Economies," p. 4.
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the reforms, thus far, have not turned the
economy around. In the first two months of 1990, incomes rose 14 to 15
percent, while production rose less than two percent. Efforts to raise fuel
prices were protested by official trade unions and were rescinded by the
government. The latest reform program, initiated in mid-March called for a
transition to a "planned-market" economy. The reform package includes
new laws on freedom of economic activity and the development of
entrepreneurship, taxation in kind, indexation of incomes and reform of
price structures and price increases.
Politically, perestroika has achieved its goals. It has broken the
Communists' approximately seventy year constitutional guarantee on power
and has created a legislative and executive branch with real power.
Unfortunately, perestroika has compromised on its economic reforms. The
major lesson to learn from perestroika are:
" The old Soviet model, typified by the Brezhnev regime, is totally
discredited;
" Andropov's solution of moral discipline did not accomplish its goal of
reform;
" The GDR-type of streamlining efficiency did not prove to be the model
for communism;
" Compromised piecemeal reforms of the economy, especially in state-
controlled enterprises and industrial organizations, will not be
successful as long as they are operated by people who are hostile to
private initiative, competition, markets, and profits; and
" For complete reform to occur, the Soviets must come up with a
politically and economically comprehensive strategy.
Three comprehensive options are open for the Soviet Union. First, they
can reform all at once, perhaps after some groundwork is laid out. This "Big
Bang" strategy is the most radical and offers the highest risk. The second
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strategy is to change gradually and sequentially with the hope that reforms
will have a better opportunity to take hold. This approach runs the risk of
being compromised by those afraid to reach the final objective of an open
economy. In addition, the gradual approach destroys many of the old
institutions without providing a complete outlet for reformers to take
initiative. The last comprehensive option is for the Soviets to transform
their society by sector. This option might offer congruence and stability. It
also runs the risk of its goals being compromised by those accustomed to
minimum effort for minimum reward. The last two options run the risk of
losing confidence from people whose expectations are growing. Many believe
that it is a desire for a comprehensive strategy that is behind Gorbachev's
creation of a new and stronger presidency.
The logic of perestroika requires that Soviets themselves must
comprehensively solve their own problems. Not only is the economic
system to be reformed but, also the political, legal and social system. This is
an approach never taken by the Soviets.
This self-reliant and radical approach to solving domestic problems has
become even more important as the difficulties increase. Perestroika's
challenges seem to grow with increasing consumer shortages, an unstable
currency, and lack of economic incentives. However, Gorbachev has stayed
with perestroika and he appears to be willing to invest more of his own
leadership capital into the process.
Elements of the Marxist-Leninist ideology are incompatible with the
decentralization and democratization in perestroika and will hinder
overcoming the problems. The Soviets will eventually have to make new
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political arrangements. In addition, perestroika goes beyond domestic reform
to novoe mishlenie, new thinking, which includes new thinking on national
interests and foreign affairs. Here too, perestroika offers radical changes.
For all the Soviet military expansion and efforts to establish troops
throughout the world, the old model has not brought greater security nor
lasting success. If anything, the previous thinking has provided the following
conclusions:
" The military buildup by Brezhnev brought more insecurity instead of
more security. Soviet actions, such as deployment of the SS-20s in
Europe caused Western powers to respond with a greater commitment
to military build-up;
" Military and political accomplishments, such as assistance in the Third
World were at a great cost and short lived;
* The military buildup nearly bankrupted the economy;
* Regional conflicts have gotten out of control and have resulted in
undesired confrontations. Worse unrest could follow; and
* Sound national security could be achieved only multilaterally, not
unilaterally. 68
Gorbachev understood that the success of perestroika, especially after
adding democratization, required a calm international environment and
external economic assistance. While reaching a solution to achieve this, the
new Soviet leadership came to realize that Brezhnev's long-sought total
security was not only unattainable, but counterproductive.
The old Soviet model of defense was based on looking at the worse case of
a protracted, global non-nuclear war simultaneously conducted against
NATO, China, and Japan. Previous Soviet leaders concluded the that fight
68Ibid, p. 2.
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under such circumstances for long. Under the assumption that there were no
winners going nuclear, the previous Soviet leaders saw their only hope was
in following Hitler's blitzkrieg strategy. Their plan was to drive through
Europe within three weeks to a month, outflank and destroy the enemy and
try to kill or capture the United States' force of 325,000 and their dependents
in Europe. They could use their early success and hostages as bargaining chips
to complete a war on favorable terms.69
Compounding this military strategy was the realization that their
economy was deteriorating and their military technology was falling further
behind the West and Japan. Because of Soviets actions, NATO became
stronger, not weaker. As each year in the cold war progressed, it became
evident to Gorbachev that the USSR had very little chance of avoiding
significant damage in a major military confrontation.
Gorbachev rebelled from the Soviet doctrinal assumption that world war
was inevitable. Shortly after assuming power, Gorbachev gathered the other
Warsaw Pact leader to agree that, 'achieving a durable peace was a thoroughly
realistic task.' 70 Gorbachev's commitment of restructuring the Soviet
economy necessitated total commitment to reallocate resources from defense
to consumer goods production.
69Marshall Brement, "Reflections on Soviet New Thinking on Security,"
Naval War College Review, pp. 5-21, v. XLII, no. 4, Seq. 328, Autumn 1989, p.
9.
7 0Michael MccGwire, "Perestroika and Soviet National Security - VIII:
1987-88, Rethinking War," paper presented to the Brookings Institute,
February 1990, p. 2.
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New thinkers appear ultimately to have changed the way Soviets look at
security. The essence of Gorbachev's new thinking, as it pertains to foreign
affairs and security are:
" War prevention is a fundamental component of Soviet military
doctrine;
" No war, including nuclear war, is a rational continuation of politics;
" Inadvertent paths to nuclear war are as likely, or more likely, than
deliberate paths;
" Political means of enhancing security are more effective than military
means;
" Security based on a mutual concept in that Soviet security cannot be
enhanced by increasing other states' insecurity;
" Reasonable sufficiency (basing a defense posture on sufficiency to repel
aggression rather than a goal of achieving military superiority) for the
future development of the Soviet military's combat capabilities;
" Defensive (non-provocative) defense is the basis for Soviet military
strategy, instead of offensive capabilities and operations71
Formally including war prevention in their doctrine gives the Soviets a
legitimate basis for trading off current forces and future increments of
military power for future stability. The "no war" concept offers a basis for
attempting to reduce tensions and engage in truly cooperative behavior.
Soviets perceive nuclear weapons as a threat in its own right. The Soviets
claim now to emphasize the political means of guaranteeing security.
The most ambiguous of the concepts in Gorbachev's new thinking is
reasonable sufficiency. Not even the new thinkers have an agreed definition.
For some Soviets, reasonable sufficiency is a shift away from the policy of the
71Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New
Political Thinking on Security," International Security, pp. 124-163, v. 13, no.
2, Fall 1988, p. 133.
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past of increasing military capabilities when it is perceived that the West is
increasing its military capabilities to one of setting a course of arming the
Soviet Union to merely "defend." Other Soviets view reasonable sufficiency
in opposite terms; as a strict maintenance of parity by matching Western
military efforts. Therefore, it can not be operational until the Soviet leaders
decide what it means and how it is determined. The concept of a defensive
defense is a strategy of offensive self-denial. Soviet forces would be
configured and deployed to stop an offense, prevent it from gaining ground,
then push the offense back to the border. New thinkers in the USSR argue
defensive defense removes the fear of a surprise Soviet conventional attack
on Europe or Asia.
If the Soviet Union literally adopts novoe mishlenie, the changes in its
military will be far-reaching. For example, if new thinking includes the
concepts of a defensive defense, a revision in educating officers and training
the forces in strategy, operations, and tactics is necessary. The military
organization will have to be restructured and forces altered to reflect a more
defensive posture. Forward deployment of Soviet forces will appear
contradictory to Soviets' new concept of gearing their military to defending
Soviet territory only. A Forward military and fuel stockage and engineering
support should be withdrawn. Military exercises should shift from offensive
to defensive scenarios. 72
72William E. Odom, "Gorbachev's Strategy and Western Security:
Illusions Versus Reality," The Washington Quarterly, pp. 145-155, v. 13, no. 1,
Winter 1990, p. 147-148.
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Reasonable sufficiency of military resources to defend the homeland from
invasion and a defensive defense should also affect the Soviet Navy. If the
Soviets are sincere about their new thinking, the drive for a blue-water navy
to attack United States lines of communications will have to cease. Their
naval infantry and sealift and airlift capabilities will have to be reduced.
Specifically the Soviets should alter their military cooperation with Cuba by
limiting, or stopping, their use of Cien Fuegos submarine base. Naval
exercises in the Gulf of Mexico should cease.73 However, internal security
issues have become more pressing for the Soviets.
The problem of Soviet nationalities presents a significant threat to Soviet
internal security. The Soviet government's stability has been threatened by
the violent confrontations in the southern republics and the mass non-
violent secessionist drive in the western republics. Instability is likely to
increase with democratization of perestroika in the current political contents.
There appears to be a dichotomy between perestroika and the desire to
maintain the Soviet Union intact. The push to restore the Soviet economy
through a democratizing process has led to demands of regional self-
determination. It is not surprising that the nationality problems erupted as
soon as there was an outlet for freedom of speech and assembly.
Pork sees the formation of nationality movements the result of vertical
and horizontal contradictions. Vertical contradictions are the result of
colonial exploitation of national resources by the central government.
Horizontal contradictions resulted from economic, political and cultural
73Ibid, p. 148.
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interests of the different nationalities. 74 The development of recent national
movements has had five stages:
" Local cunsciousness with debates on local issues, especially
environmental;
" Emancipation of political thinking where debates evolved to such topics
of self-management;
" Popular front period where discontented forces organized and set
agendas.
" Official response period which has involved replacing local party and
government officials, hopefully to appease the discontented
" Legislative period when radical laws are enacted by local parliaments. 75
G. CONCLUSIONS ON CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION
It appears the Soviets have learned from the failures in the Brezhnev era
and before, and that the lessons learned are apparently what shaped
perestroika. While they may have learned some lessons, they have not been
able to put everything into practice.
The Soviets are closer in line on mutual security with the West than,
possibly at any other time. Gorbachev has already started to withdraw Soviet
troops out of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. He promises further cuts in the
military and has already promised to bring back all of its 627,500 troops
stationed outside the Soviet borders by the year 2000.76 Gorbachev's military
74Andrus Pork, "Global Security and Soviet Nationalities," The
Washington Quarterly, v. 13, no. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 38-39.
75Ibid., pp 40-41.
76The Times, "Kremlin to Bring Home all Troops by the Year 2000," 16
December 1989. The 627,500 figure for total number of troops is a Soviet
figure.
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cut-backs have shaken the foundation from which international affairs have
been conducted. When Gorbachev renounced the Brezhnev doctrine and
encouraged the transformation toward self-government in the Warsaw Pact,
he began a new era.
A major point to watch in all the changes that have occurred in the
Soviet Union is the ultimate purpose for perestroika. The Bush
Administration warns that if perestroika's ultimate objective is to make the
present Soviet model stronger, then the Soviet Union may become a "more
formidable and dangerous competitor."77 With his economy in the process of
disintegration, loss of vital power in the rest of Europe, and public unrest at
home, Gorbachev does not have time to think up devious long-term
strategies. He must be merely hoping to salvage anything he can of the
empire.
Gorbachev has not yet brought democracy to the Soviet Union through
democratization of perestroika. Economic efficiency in this information age
calls for greater individual freedom and more information. Achieving
economic revitalization will require Gorbachev to make increasing
unpopular measures at home based on the market and require institutions
and people set to handle a democratic market-based society. At a conference
in Stockholm of the Institute for East West Security Studies in June 1990,
economists from the Soviet Union, the United States and West Germany
77james A. Baker, "Points of Mutual Advantage: Perestroika and
American Foreign Policy," prepared address for the Foreign Policy
Association, New York City, 16 October 1989, United States Department of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy no. 1213, p. 4.
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agreed that the economic situation in the USSR was desperate. These
economists did not think Gorbachev was willing or able to do what is needed
to reverse the sharp decline. At the conference, Soviet economist Oleg
Bogomolev said, "We are getting the shock without the therapy."78
The West has prudently searched for signs indicating the direction of
perestroika and the verdict is still out. What can already be determined is
that the Soviet Union can not now return to the former status quo. The
consequences of Gorbachev's actions and the ensuing events opened the door
for the many in the Soviet Union to vent out their frustration with the
Soviet system and to demand a better standard of living.
The changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union effect Western
nations' security as well. NATO and relations between Western nations are
changing as each new development occurs in the former communist bloc.
An analysis of European security will lead to better formulation of security
postures.
78Flora Lewis, "The Russian Question," The New York Times, 9 June,
1990, p. 15.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
May we venture the vision of a common European House in which no
one need fear that he will be threatened or indeed attacked by his
neighbor, a house with open doors, permitting free communication, a
Europe of freedom and self-determination? We must venture such
visions and let them become reality through our deeds Otherwise we
shall be without hope.
Hans-Dietrich Gensher 79
The rapid changes in the Soviet Union and in Eastern and Central Europe
have dramatically altered the status quo of European security. The bottom
line is that Marxist-Leninist ideology has been swept away in Europe, not by
governments, but by people taking to the streets. Because East and Central
European countries have grown steadily more independent from Moscow
and the Soviet hegemony has quickly disappeared, the Warsaw Pact, always a
front for Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, has become hollow and is in
the process of decomposition. The Soviets have repudiated the Brezhnev
Doctrine, allowing self-determination in the Pact. Therefore, the political
rationale for the Warsaw Pact has disappeared. If the negotiation on
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) succeed then its military rationale will
also have disappeared.
Although the triumph of liberal democracy over the communist
dictatorships was in many ways a tribute to the political and economic resolve
79Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister Federal Republic of Germany,
Speech at the meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies,
Potsdam, 11 June 1988, German Information Center, 13 June 1988, p. 7.
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of the the Western system, it has actually left the West in confusion. The
collapse of communism and the independence of East and Central Europe
raise the question about the nature of Europe, the process of European
integration, and how to define Europe's identity now that reintegration of the
Warsaw Pact countries into the West is possible. 8° Speculation runs ahead of
events and Western governments and other interests are competing to
reshape Europe and to redefine the proper place of the Germans. As a result,
an analysis of changes in European security and NATO is necessary.
It is worthy to review the basic goals of European security:
" Easing tensions between East and West and reducing the risk of war;
" Reducing military forces on all sides, with associated budgetary savings;
* Ending the division of the continent; and
" Ensuring the basic political, economic, and social freedoms for all the
peoples of Europe.81
The central question in European security has historically been and
continues to be, What to do about Germany?
A. THE GERMAN QUESTION
The beginning of the end of the cold war occurred when the GDR opened
the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. The start of a new era occurred in the
city where the collapse of Four-Power control began the post-WWII cold war.
It is also appropriate that it occurred on German soil, because Germany, with
8°Schopflin, p. 15.
81Robert E. Hunter, "Beyond the Cold War: The European Agenda," The
Washington Quarterly, pp. 35-49, Autumn 1989, p 37.
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a history of attempts at European hegemony, had always presented problems
to European security.
The post-WWII order provided a temporary solution to the age-old
German problem. This order had an implicit and explicit purpose. The
explicit purpose was to contain Soviet expansion. The implicit purpose was
to constrain Germany. The post-WWII solution was to divide Germany and
make both halves dependent on others for their security.82
With the downfall of Communist power in East Germany and some form
of German reunification inevitable, Germany returns as the center of concern
for European security. Joffe explains the dual question as, "What kind of
European architecture could accommodate what kind of united Germany?"83
Before examining answers to this question, the logic of German
unification must be examined. First, it must be understood that nationalism
or political mission are not driving unification, nor are the powerful West
Germans the principle drivers of unification. That is not to say that West
Germans do not favor unification. In March 1990, surveys of public opinion
in West Germany indicated 78.4 percent were in favor of the reunification of
the German states into a single country and only 12.4 percent favored separate
and independent states.84 The powerless East Germans are driving
82josef Joffe, "Once More: The German Question," Survival, pp. 129-140,
v. XXXII, March/April 1990, p. 135 -136.
83Ibid.
84Wolfgang G. Gibowski and Holli A. Semetko, Public Opinion in the
USA and the Federal Republic Germany: A Two Nation Study, Friedrich-
Naumann-Stiftung, March 1990, p. 1 of survey. The Friedrich-Naumann
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reunification, and not for nationalistic or purely political freedom. Rather, it
is primarily for economic reasons. The East Germans' desire for a higher
living standard, more than any nationalist sentiment or belief in a political
ideology, has created the momentum for reunification.
Second, the logic for unification was driven by necessity. Even after the
GDR opened the Iron Curtain, East Germans continued to escape to West
Germany. This left East Germany with a people drain and the FRG with
increasing strain on its welfare system, economy, and housing market.
Ultimately, the only options left for leaders on both sides was some type of
"all-German reunification, or reunification on West German soil."85
With public opinion strongly behind unification, it is not surprising how
quickly democratic politics fell into line, especially with 1990 an election year
in West Germany. West German Chancellor Kohl has proven to have an
intuitive knack for discerning the direction of public opinion and setting his
course accordingly. Hahn describes this model of leading as the "presiding
leader. '8 6 Until Kohl's Ten Point Plan, enunciated on 28 November 1989,
most political parties, including the Social Democrat and the Christian
Democrats, were ambivalent on unification. By the beginning of the year,
however, practically all parties vying for future electoral gains followed public
Foundation is a non-profit organization affiliated with the West German Free
Democratic Party (FDP), the junior partner in the West German governing
coalition.
85Joffe, p. 132.
86Walter F. Hahn, "NATO and Germany," Global Affairs, pp. 1-18,
Winter, 1990, p. 14.
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opinion and called for German reunification. Only the Greens in West
Germany and the intellectuals and party reformers of East Germany who
started the major East German opposition party, New Forum, still opposed
reunification. These groups opposed reunification because they fear that East
Germans will merely become wards of the FRG. New Forum claims to strive
for a society less materialistic and more humanistic than that offered by the
FRG.
In answer to what kind of European architecture could accommodate
what kind of united Germany, obviously the post war two-nation solution for
Germany has lost its reason. Joffe argues that, as the the post-war order's
explicit function (containment of Soviet power) became outdated, the
division of Germany (the implicit function) lost its credibility. 87 Assuming
that some type reunification is inevitable, the question then turns to what
form will Germany take and what that means to the rest of Europe?
At a minimum, the Germanys will remain two separate federations
joined economically. More likely, elections in East Germany will result in its
incorporations into the FRG as five newly reformed lander (states). The
incorporation is not expected to be merely a swallowing up of the GDR by the
FRG and an expansion of the West German state. East Germany will have to
have a say in the direction of the new Germany. However, there is little
doubt the the FRG's government organs and constitution will remain intact.
Under the "two-plus-four" formula worked out in Ottawa, the fate of
Germany will be decided by East and West Germans then ratified by the four
87joffe, p. 136.
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wartime powers (Britain, France, Soviet Union, and United States).
Interested countries, Poland in particularly, will continue to put pressure for a
"broader European framework," possibly within the 35-country Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), scheduled to meet this
summer.88
The Germany dilemma deepens after reunification. The major questions
will be: How will German reunification affect the European integration via
the EC and how will it affect the European security status quo, specifically
NATO?
Reunification is of high concern to all in the EC. Secretary Baker stated in
December 1989, in Berlin:
The example of Western cooperation through the European Community
has already had a dramatic effect on Eastern attitudes toward economic
liberty. The success of this great European experiment, perhaps more
than any other factor, has caused Eastern European to recognize that
people as well as nations cooperate more productively when they are
free to choose.89
The plan for Europe 1992, with transitional mergers and commitment to
democracy has proven to be a very attractive means for the people in Eastern
and Central Europe to rebuild their economies. Some fear, however, that
unification of Germany will weaken the EC's chances of reaching its goals for
88 Gregory F. Treverton, "Reconstructing European Security," Council on
Foreign Relations, March 1990, p. 1-4.
89james A. Baker, "A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a
New Era," prepared address to the Berlin Press Club at the Steigneverger
Hotel in Berlin, 12 December 1989, United States Department of State, Bureau
of Public Affairs, Current Policy no. 1233, p. 3.
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1992. The EC wanted to take consolidating steps among its present members
before dealing with new members. Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, Senior
Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of International Relations in
Paris, claims that many in the European Community secretly wished that the
Eastern Europeans had postponed their revolutions until after 1992.90
Everyone, including the Soviet Union, is certain of East Germany
becoming a full member of the EC when it joins West Germany. The EC
formally endorsed Chancellor Kohl's reunification goal at its December 1989
summit in Strasbourg in a bargain for West German support of a timetable
for European monetary integration. 91 Still, there is concern that German
commitment to a united Europe will be diverted by the task of restructuring
East Germany. The cost of assuming the economic responsibility for East
Germany has been estimated at $100 billion.92 Many fear that a unified
Germany will philosophically and economically withdraw from the EC as it
tries to reconstruct the GDR portion of Germany. Prime Minister Thatcher
has been the most unyielding in pointing out West German's "reticence
90 Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, Senior Research Fellow, Center, Fondation
Nationale Des Sciences Politiques (CERI), Paris, "Germany and Europe: Old
Dilemmas, New Solutions?", paper presented at the "Helsinki II and the
Future of Europe Conference", Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington D.C.,
23-24 April 1990, p. 6.
91jim Hoagland, "Europe's Destiny," Foreign Affairs, pp. 33-50, v. 69, no. 1,
1990, p. 39.
92Hobart Rowen, "Europe 1992," The Washington Post, 12 April 1990,
A25.
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about monetary union. '93 Also, the poorer countries in the EC, such as Greece
and Portugal, fear the rebuilding of East Germany will work to their
disadvantage. These countries fear that pressure to rebuild East Germany's
economy will re-divert monetary assistance they had hoped for.
In addition, it has become apparent that West Germany has the ability
and willingness to use its economic power to accomplish the goal of
becoming even more influential in Eastern Europe.94 There is a perception
with some in the community that the new Germany, especially with East
Germans included as decision makers, will want to widen rather than deepen
the EC by pushing for inclusion of other Warsaw Pact countries, notably
Poland and Hungary. The Eastern Europeans desperately desire to be
associated with the prosperous West and the EC. One good example of
Germany's sympathy toward the former communist satellites was revealed at
the end of November 1989, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Gensher flew to Budapest to sign a $279 million untied loan to
Hungary. Le Monde wrote that Gensher expressed his 'gratitude' for the
Hungarian government's decision to reopen its boarder with Austria on a
permanent basis allowing East German refuges to flee. Gensher also
promised to support Hungary's bid for EC associate sta.us.95
Many EC members desire the opposite: Deepening the EC, by





members, rather than widening the EC by including more members. This
desire has resulted in turning back even a rich outsider, Austria. There are
those who fear that the admittance of East Germany into the EC via West
Germany will enhance the power of the West and further cause the isolation
of the Soviet Union. Finally, there is concern that the larger Germany will
alter the balance of power among the 12, leaving France and Great Britain
more insecure and forcing them to push for widening the EC as a counter to
German dominance.
Others are more positive of the situation. The optimists believe that fears
that West Germany will be too distracted by the rebuilding of East Germany to
continue the building of the EC, and that a larger united Germany will disturb
the balance of power of the existing 12 EC members have been exaggerated.
As far as Soviet Union isolated from the EC with the inclusion of East
Germany, Hoagland feels this will actually work to the Soviets' advantage.
The GDR is currently the Soviet Union's most important trading partner;
Twelve percent of Soviet trade is with the GDR. Since the Soviets will more
likely continue to have economic ties with a new Germany, the USSR will
immediately benefit by the higher quality machine tools and the West
German marks it will get after German currency unification occurs in July
1990.96 Also, West German business is regarded highly in the Soviet Union as
the most loyal and dependable of all Western trading partners and political
unification is not likely to change theat feeling. Finally, reunification will act
96Ibid.
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as an economic window to the EC for the Soviets who desperately desire
more economic contact.
In addition, there is the argument that a unified Germany will be under
political pressure by skeptics, such as Great Britain, to demonstrate its
commitment to EC and provide more to a unified Europe than it would have
before. Ultimately, others argue, Germany will commit itself to EC 1992 for
the most basic reason of self-interest. Thus, "A bigger market and a freer flow
of goods and services, plus monetary coordination around the Bundesbank
without sharing any real power over German fiscal policy" is in Germany's
interest.97 However Germany is defined, though, it will once again become
the heart of Europe, linking instead of dividing East and West.
Just as important as the issue discussed above is determining how
reunification will affect the security of NATO. Solutions for arranging a place
for the reunified Germany in Europe range from NATO membership to
neutra'ity. The overall position of the West in approaching a new European
security order in relation to Germany is to preserve and strengthen Western
institu-.ions that have proven effective and to ensure that a reunified
Germany remains strongly anchored in the West. The United States'
preference is for an asymmetrical relationship where a unified Germany is a
full mcmber of NATO. American officials believe that eventually the Soviets
will agree because of the Realpolitik argument that it is in the Soviet Union's
97Treverton, p. 5.
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interest to have a Germany grounded to some alliance rather than a Germany
unaffiliated in the center of Europe.98
There is broad support in the FRG and the rest of Europe for Germany
remaining in NATO. The FRG government desires to stay in NATO for
reasons of stability and to maintain close ties with the industrialized West
which are all in their self-interest. FRG's Minister of Defense, Dr. Gerhard
Stoltenberg, said on 1 May 1990,
Together with its with its allies, the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany has made clear that despite due respect for the security
interests of the Soviet Union and all our neighbors a future single
Germany must not be neutralized or demilitarized but should continue
to be integrated in the Western Alliance for security policy purposes.
This is not only a sequel of our history, but a necessity under the aspect
of stability for the whole of Europe.99
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have supported this position.
Poland's, support for a united Germany in NATO is due to anxiety produced
by an unaligned and powerful Germany. Most of Europe believes that a
Germany anchored firmly to the United States and Western Europe through
NATO membership is less threatening than a Germany that is militarily
isolated. Polish foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski warned at the
February 1990 meeting between NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in
Ottawa,
98Ibid, p. 10-11.
99Gerhard Stoltenberg, Federal Minister of Defense Federal Republic of
Germany, "German Unity and European Security," Speech at the Johns
Hopkins University, Washington D.C., I May 1990, p. 9.
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Through neutrality you might easily isolate that economic giant and you
might create a situation where Germany tries to become a power or a
superpower on the European stage.100
The reemergence of the German question caused Gorbachev to stop his
campaign to dissolve NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Initially,analysts predicted
that the Soviets might attempt to trade the withdrawal of 350,000 Soviet
troops from East Germany for the departure of unified Germany from
NATO. 01 As each day passes, however, Moscow plays this game with a
weaker hand against the West. Many believe that if the Soviet Union hopes
to salvage anything from the disintegrating Soviet position in Europe, it will
be the hope of access to the Western economy. Therefore, Moscow may not
insist on neutrality for a united Germany. At present, the Soviets might
agree to a united Germany NATO membership if, like France, it had no
foreign troops stationed on its soil and did not subordinate its own troops to
the NATO military command in peacetime. 102 Another option which the
Soviets might accept is that suggested by West German foreign minister
Hans-Dietrich Gensher for a unified Germany in NATO but with its eastern
half demilitarized. Both suggestions as of mid 1990 were not acceptable to the
United States and Great Britain.
Another issue in European security related to the German question is
determining what to do with the American, French and British troops in
100Lewis Paul, "United Germany urged to be in NATO," The New York





West Germany and Soviet troops in East Germany after reunification. If a
new Germany remained in NATO but had no foreign troops, NATO would
be a very different alliance. Assuming that Germany remains in NATO, then
one can expect the Soviets to push for this arrangement in exchange for
removal of its troops in the eastern part or insist on leaving their troops in
Germany, but at a reduced number.
The questions of troops in a reunited Germany may be dealt with in
short- versus long- range approaches. For the foreseeable future, there
appears to be much support in Europe for foreign troops remaining in
Germany. However, if the expression of public opinion in East Germany in
November 1989 can be taken as a populace's total rejection of the the Socialist
Unity (Communist) Party (SED) government, it is questionable whether the
East Germans will be amicable to any solutions that allow the continued
presence of Soviet troops that held up the old regime. In the long run,
foreign troops inside a new Germany will have to be considered within an
overall reexamination of security and cooperation in Europe. The interests of
the Soviet Union must be considered an integral part in the reexamination of
long-range security in Europe.
B. THE RUSSIAN QUESTION
The German question is much of concern to Europe and North America,
but the Soviet crisis adds to the potentially volatile mixture. In 1989, the
Russian question for the West was whether and how to help the Soviet
Union. Now the majority view appears to follows Hans-Dietrich Gensher's
question: How does the Soviet Union fit into the new Europe?
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Prudent minds in the West want to ensure that the Soviet Union has a
place in the new European order. The peril for the Soviets is to be left out of
the restructuring of Europe while its former East European allies enjoy an
economic reconstruction. Another concern is how not to leave the Soviet
Union militarily threatened. A Soviet Union isolated from the rest of Europe
and threatened is not in the interest of stability. Whatever happens within
the Soviet Union, the Russians will retain nuclear weapons and a mighty
military force. No matter how uncertain the Soviet future, it in not wise to
try to exclude the USSR from the European settlement. It is especially unwise
because the Soviet future is so uncertain. Therefore, Treverton views the
immediate Russian question as whether to make the final outcome of the
new Europe, especially as it applies with the new Germany, more agreeable to
the Soviets by arranging a balance of military force between NATO and the
Soviet Union. 103
The current European symmetry revolves around military and
economics. The Soviet Union will require some compromise in return for
giving up military and economic dominance over Eastern and Central
Europe and for not standing in the way of German unity. 104 There is a
temptation for the West is to ignore symmetry between NATO and Soviet
military forces. Some believe it is unnecessary because the Soviet Union is
too weak not to accept whatever the final structure of the new Europe will be.




afford to to alienate the West, some believe the USSR cannot call out its
troops in Eastern Europe to resist the new order without risking total collapse.
Following this argument, the Soviet Union can only hope to slow down the
process of change in Europe in order to buy time for them to gain economic
and political strength in order to counter Western diplomatic initiatives. The
Soviet Union can try to keep open the option for developing some kind of
community of interests between a socialist-capitalist Eastern Europe and a
reconstructed Soviet Union. It could begin to share in the economic and
technological benefits of closer Western ties.
Making the Soviet Union feel more secure in this time of transition is
important. However, no matter how hard the West attempts to
accommodate the Soviets in a new Europe, the West will still be dealing with
a nation in the midst of, what Zbigniew Brzezinski called on 7 June 1990 at a
conference at John Hopkins University, "democratizing chaos." 105 It is
impossible to determine how the Soviet Union should fit into the new
Europe because we cannot predict the future of the Soviet Union.
105 quoted from CSPAN, 9 June 1990.
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V. ANALYSIS OF CHANGING RELATIONSHIP IN NATO
AND WARSAW PACT
To analyze the relationship of Europe and the West and particularly the
future of the security structure, the implications of the changes for the
Warsaw Pact and NATO must be integrated. Events have caused the alliances
to change its approach from confrontation to cooperation. The West has
recognized that it is now dealing with countries on the path toward
democracy. This revolution for democracy in the Warsaw Pact paves the way
for a new security policy.
A. WARSAW PACT
Combining the analysis of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO) risks providing too much legitimacy to the Warsaw Pact than it
deserved. The two alliances were not mirror images. Unlike NATO, the
WTO, through Soviet hegemony, denied its members a national security
policy. All countries contributed troops, but only the Soviet Union
participated in the decisions involved in the collective defense of the states.
The forces contributed were considered as components of the Soviet Union's
military operations. Therefore, NATO generally did considered the East
European countries as serious participants in military actions against the
West. Even the Soviets behaved in ways showing doubt about their allies
reliability. For example, Nelson argues that the Soviet's reliance on highly
armored "superdivisions," called operational maneuvering groups, to
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heighten ratios of troops and armor was due to their inability to depend on
the huge WTO numerical superiorities over NATO forces 1 06
B. SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS
In a speech to the United Nation on 7 December 1988, President
Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce its
armed forces by 500,000 troops, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 800
combat aircraft. Of the 500,000 figure (100,000 will be officers) approximately
half will come in Eastern Europe and the European portions of the Soviet
Union. When completed in 1990, the House Armed Service Committee
estimated that this will reduce Soviet capabilities in East and Central Europe
by 20 to 25 percent and make a surprise attack in Europe "impossible."10 7
Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral Soviet force reductions in Europe
and Asia triggered a series of announced cuts by the NonSoviet Warsaw Pact
(NSWP) members.
Central Intelligence Agency Director Webster reported to House Armed
Service Committee that withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Eastern Europe
appeared to be on schedule as of 1 March 1990. Three tank divisions and
additional tanks, totaling approximately 2,700 have already been removed
and an equal number are expected to be withdrawn by the end of 1990. Soviet
106 Daniel N. Nelson, "Watching the Pact Unravel: The Transformation
of East European Political-Military Policies," paper presented to the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1990, p. 1-3.
07Barry M. Blechman, "Dialogue on Changing Soviet Forces, " The New
York Times, 16 January 1989, A15.
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assault landing formations and units, and assault river crossing forces were
withdrawn from Eastern Europe in 1989.108
United States State Department analysts concluded that Soviet military
spending declined in 1989 between 14 and 16 percent of GNP, down from 15 to
17 percent i- 1988.109 John Helgerson, CIA deputy director for intelligence
testified on 20 April 1990 to the Congressional Joint Economic Committee
that Soviet defense procurement outlays fell by six to seven percents in 1989
and personnel and operations spending also decreased. 110 Soviet Marshall
Sergei Akhromeyev stated that annual tank production dropped to 1,700 in
1989, one-half the number that the United States says were produced
annually, on the average, between 1986 and 1988. Western intelligence
sources confirmed that Soviet tank production is declining but did not
provide amounts. 111
Changes in the Soviet conventional threat have included naval forces. In
September 1989, the Defense Department reported that Soviet naval activity
outside home waters had dropped by 15 percent. On 1 February 1990, General




°Bill Gertz, "13,322 Warheads Credited to Soviets " The Washington
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out-of-area (OOA) deployments will continue to decline." 2 One week later
Admiral Kelso, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command
amplified the observation:
The Soviets have decrease OOA operations substantially in the last few
years.. .We see very few submarine patrols in the the Atlantic anymore.
They have scaled down the number of forces they have in the
Mediterranean, therefore we see fewer transducing back and forth to the
Mediterranean. They have reduced their deployments to Cuba... I think
they pulled back to support the idea of a defensive doctrine.113
Admiral Hardisty, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, has
also confirmed decreasing Soviet naval operations in the Pacific, as well as a
withdrawal of various units from forward deployments in the region,
including at Cam Rahn Bay, Vietnam.1 14
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral C.A.H. Trost cautioned on being too
optimistic about the Soviet Navy. He testified to the House Appropriations
Defense Subcommittee in February 1990 that the Soviet Navy continues "a
robust aircraft carrier construction program" and that their 1989 submarine
construction rate matched their 1988 rate of nine ships (double the number of
those produced in the United States. 115
112 Quoted in U.S. Senate, Speech of U.S. Senator Sam Nunn on "The
Changed Threat Environment of the 1990's," presented 29 March 1990, p. 7.
113 1bid.
114 1bid, p.
115U.S. Department of the Navy, Statement by Admiral C.A.H. Trost, U.S.
Navy Chief of Naval Operations Before the U.S. House Appropriations
Defense Subcommittee on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1991 Budget of the
lUnited States Navy, presented 22 February 1990, p. 3.
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In the mid-range of five to eight years, Soviet troops may be expected to
withdraw from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Soviet Union's unilateral
withdrawal from Eastern and Central Europe, will include 462,000 forces prior
to further announced reduction. 116
Despite significant withdrawals and reductions in Soviet conventional
capabilities, the Soviets continue to build up their strategic forces. The
Defense Intelligence Agency reported in April 1990 that the Soviets have
deployed 13,322 nuclear warheads on 1,378 intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), 954 submarine-based nuclear missiles and 620 nuclear armed
bombers. The United States has an estimated 12,570 nuclear warheads on
1000 ICBMs, 608 submarine-launched missiles and 291 bombers.1 17
Soviet improvements also are continuing on the silo-based SS-18s and its
MOD-5 upgrade, which have been introduced into some of their deployed SS-
18s. The SS-25 road mobile, single warhead missile continues to be produced.
The train mounted SS-24 mobile missile is in serial production. Soviet
bomber production also is continuing with the Blackjack, Backfire, and Bear
H bombers and cruise missile carriers. Finally, SSBN deployments continue
at the rate of one per year.1 18
116 U.S. Senate, Speech of U.S. Senator Sam Nunn on "The Changed
Threat Environment of the 1990's," presented 29 March 1990, p. 4-5.
17Gertz, p. 11.
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8U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Defense
Policy Panel, Statement by the Honorable Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant
Secretary of Defense International Security, Before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Armed Services Defense Policy Panel, Second
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On the basis of these investments it is clear that the most interesting and
potentially troublesome development of the current Soviet military is that
they have adopted the United States' philosophy and are willing to sacrifice
quantity for quality. Force reduction is good, but when compared to the
Soviets actions with strategic weapons, it is clear they are not gearing down
where it is most important.
C. NONSOVIET WARSAW PACT (NSWP)
With the collapse of the Soviet hegemony, NSWP countries are not
expected to maintain the former security interest of the WTO, i.e.,
maintaining Soviet supremacy in the name of communism. Rather, they are
expected to concentrate on individual national interests. In the short-term,
the WTO will probably continue but in a different form.
For the most part, the ties between army and party have eroded at the
national level leaving a coalition between younger, reform-minded officers
and non-communist politicians. Public opinion in the WTO nations largely
now openly distrusts the military, viewed as the protectors of the communist
regimes.
Although not all new NSWP governments have been elected formed,
there are clear signs of a diminished military effort in the WTO the NSWP
reductions announced after Gorbachev's speech to the United Nation in
December 1988. Poland began the military reduction in 1987 by placing two
Session, 101st Congress on "Contingency Forces," presented 22 March 1990, p.
3-4.
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mechanized division into Category III status (deactivating most personnel
and retaining them as cadre-only units) and down-sizing two airborne
divisions into brigades with a reduction of 40,000 troops over two years and
the retiring of 850 tanks and 80 fighter planes. 119 According to Zbigniew
Blechman, former Commander of the Pomeranian Military District, the
Polish army planed to restructure its three mechanized infantry and two
armored divisions into three mechanized divisions, leading to fewer tanks
and more anti-tank weapons. 120 There is confirmation that the Polish ground
forces are being reorganized, including disbanding of four mechanized rifle
division and reorganizing two tank divisions into less heavily armored
mechanized-rifle divisions. 121 Poland reduced its conscription time from 24 to
18 months. 122
Hungary and Czechoslovakia followed Poland in making defense budget
cuts. Hungary has implemented the largest reduction of military budgets
announced in the WTO: a two-year 17 percent expenditure reduction for 1989-
1990 (8.5 percent per year).123 It has shortened conscription time from 18 to 12
months and plans to cut 27,500 troops by 1990. Together with the previous
119Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "East Europe," 9 January 1989,
p. 34.






reduction of 9,300 in 1989, this results in Hungary reducing its military by 35
percent.' 24 On 19 January 1990 at a Vienna conference on conventional forces
and military doctrine including NATO, WTO and neutral nations, Hungary
proposed the withdrawal of all of the estimated 50,000 to 62,000 Soviet troops
from its soil by the end of 1991.125 Hungary's disarmament initiative, which
called for a ceiling much lower than the 275,000, went further than the
positions of NATO and the WTO. Talks have already begun between
Hungary and the Soviet Union on complete Soviet troop withdrawal within
two years.
In Czechoslovakia, President Vaclav Havel is pressuring for the
withdrawal of the estimated 75,000 to 80,000 Soviet troops in his country by
the end of 1990 and is planning for a further 30 percent reduction in
Czechoslovakia's defense spending. This implies that the Czechoslovaks are
looking at unilateral troops cuts of possibly 50,000.126 In addition,
Czechoslovakia plans to reduce conscription time from 24 to 18 months.127
The largest doubts on changing the old approach to WTO security remain
in the Balkans where the requisite conditions of competitive elections and
new legal and institutional order have yet to take hold. Romania was the
only country not to announce troops reductions after Gorbachev's December
124Larrabee, p. 8-9.
125Alan Riding, "Hungary Seeks Withdrawal Of Soviet Forces in Two




1988 announcement. Considering that the army played a major role in the
ouster of Ceausescu, it is doubtful the new Romania government will make
drastic cuts in its defense budget. Bulgaria announced after December 1988
the intention to reduce its military by 10,000. Bulgarian reformist have yet
been able to provide any concrete action for further defense cuts. Because the
former communist party in Bulgaria easily won the first round of elections in
10 June 1990, the possibility of drastic cuts in the military seem even more
remote.
German reunification will more than likely remove the most important
military member of the WTO outside of the Soviet Union and possibly
hasten the alliance's disintegration. The GDR army has literally disappeared;
new recruits are no longer reporting for service, many have deserted, troops
have gone on strike, and many of its officers are attempting to join the West
German Bundeswher.128 The East German army is now, as one NATO official
put it, "devoid of any operational capability." 29
As process of democratization becomes further entrenched in systems of
the NSWP countries, public opinion will become an increasingly important
factor. Since the USSR had for 40 years controlled national security policies
for all WTO nations, the NSWP nations were denied a national security
policy based on self-interests. None of the "peoples' armies" could
realistically appeal to their "people" based on patriotism if the armed forces
128Ibid, p. 9.
12 9 U.S. Senate, Speech of U.S. Senator Sam Nunn on "The Changed
Threat Environment of the 1990's," presented 29 March 1990, p. 6.
83
were not responding to sovereign authority. Today, suspicion must still lay
in the hearts of the people.
Today's issues within the armed forces debate are sure to include
conscription and ecological concerns. Conscription is very unpopular
throughout the NSWP and already at least three of the NSWP countries have
reduced the amount of obligated service. Ecology helped form the broad
opposition base of the revolution and many of its leaders now are members
of the emerging democratizing governments. For example, the The
Bulgarian environmental group Eco-Glasnost was very influential in the
forming the opposition coalition Union of Democratic Forces.
Unfortunately, Poland is the only NSWP country collecting data
concerning mass opinion about the military. These data trace changing levels
of trust in the army, prestige for the military profession, etc., but do not link
variation in responses to social, economic, and political conditions.130
The evidence of the Warsaw Pact's disintegration is overwhelming.
Noncommunist coalitions have taken power in Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Each country is acting now more on the
basis of perceived national self-interest and the possibility of the return to the
WTO following a unilaterally defined Soviet line appears low. Hungary and
Czechoslovakia are both negotiating with the Soviet Union for the complete
withdrawal of all Soviet forces in their country by 1991. Hungarian Foreign




Germany can no longer be considered part of the WTO even though the issue
of Soviet troops remain an issue. Finally, Soviet General Chervov revealed
that the WTO's military command apparatus would no longer be governed
through communist party channels. Instead it will go through governments,
thus eliminating the Soviet Union's previous primary method to direct
control of all of the military forces in the WTO. 13 2
In the mid- and long-term, the WTO seems largely irrelevant as a
multilateral Soviet partner in European security and none of the emerging
democracies will desire to replace or revise it. In the short-term, a nominal
WTO with severely limited ties to the Soviet Union's military seem likely.
Several options for national security are in front of the present NSWP
countries. Neutrality appears a very popular option among the
noncommunists. Another idea for the NSWP countries, especially
interesting for Hungary and Poland, is creating an all-encompassing Euro-
Atlantic security organization.1 33 Both these countries have already begin
negotiating independently with NATO regarding troops levels, chemical
weapons, etc.13 4 NSWP members appear interested in maintaining the
presence of the United States in Europe while reassuring the Soviet Union
that it is not threatened. 135
132 bid.
133Ibid, p. 36-41.
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As a result in the changes in the WTO, the CIA has assessed that the
Warsaw Pact threat to the United States and its NATO allies has been reduced
significantly:
" Soviet planners have absolutely no confidence in NSWP support if a
conflict with NATO would occur;
" The military reductions already carried out have lengthened the time it
would take to the Soviets to mobilize for any large scale attack in
Europe.136
The implications of unilateral actions already taken within the WTO are
tremendous to NATO planners. The Soviet Union would have to conduct a
military attack in Europe completely alone and possibly against its former
military allies. It is extremely unlikely the Soviets would do this. The
problem is not only that the Soviet Union no longer has the assets of its WTO
allies for battle, but, that, its lines of communications and forward logistics
staging areas in Eastern Europe would not be secure. James Schlesinger
described a lone-Soviet attack on Europe now as "an act of supreme folly." 137
In an unfortunate display of poor communication between the United
States executive and legislative branches, the United States Congress
discovered in December 1989 that the U.S. intelligence community had
reached an assessment that NATO would have some 33 to 44 days of warning
time to respond to Warsaw Pact preparations for an attack. This assessment
had been reached before Gorbachev announced his substantial unilateral
136Webster, p. 7-8.
13 7 U.S. Senate, Speech of U.S. Senator Sam Nunn on "The Changed
Threat Environment of the 1990's," presented 29 March 1990, p. 6.
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conventional force reductions in December 1988.138 Further Soviet force
reduction in Eastern Europe will increase the warning time. Major General
Robinson, a senior Joint Chief of Staff official, confirmed that the unilateral
Warsaw Pact reductions would increase the warning time contained in
National Intelligence Estimate of Warning Time (NIE4-1) by "a factor of four
or five." 139 Even if Gorbachev's reliance on political means of enhancing
security over military means and a defensive defense were originally meant
to be devious, looking at his political and military position today causes one
to think that he now has no choice but to rely on politics and diplomacy and a
defensive posture in the event of a military crisis.
Demilitarization of the WTO, especially the Soviet Union can only be
regarded as a positive step toward Western stability, However, it does not
necessarily follow that the short-range disintegration of the Warsaw Pact is
equally positive. This period may give the WTO the opportunity to provide
its most important contribution to date-"as a transitional factor of
stability."1 40 The WTO can transform as a political coalition to assist the
emerging democracies in their transition to democracy. For example, they
can act as a coalition body to discuss economic assistance from the West.
Although the specifics are still unclear, many in the WTO are considering
reforming the WTO into a non-ideological organization which emphasized
138Ibid, p. 4.
139 1bid, p. 5.
140 Peter Corterier, "Quo vadis NATO?" Survival, pp. 141-156, v. XXXII,
March/April 1990, p. 142.
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political consultation for mutual security and non-interference in internal
affairs.
D. THE NATO CHALLENGE
This is a period of extensive reexamination whether NATO can and
should remain involved in shaping and managing the historic process of
change occurring in Europe. There are those that argue, with the reduction of
strength in the WTO, that here should follow a reduction in the reliance on
NATO for western security. Morton Kondracke asks, "If the Warsaw Pact is
dead, what threat justifies the continued existence of a Western military
alliance?14' The arguments continue that, since NATO and the WTO were
invented to maintain the standoff of the two superpowers, then it should
follow that, at best, NATO is only a transition organization until something
more comprehensive and effective is developed. Ultimately, the question is
whether and in what form is NATO relevant? 142
In at least the short- and mid-range, NATO is not only relevant, it is vital
to ensuing future stability of Europe. First, to equate the actions in the WTO
with those of NATO is misleading due to the different purposes for their
existence. Looking at the structure of each organization reveals why NATO
maintains relevance whereas the WTO does not in its present state. The
WTO, with its military headquarters in Moscow and no permanent civilian
headquarters or secretariat, has always been regarded as simply an extension
141Morton Kondracke, "Who Needs NATO?" The New Republic, 5 March
1990, p. 14.
142 Strobe Talbott, Time, 1 January 1990.
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of the Soviet General Staff. Only now is the WTO considering evolving into
a political organization (assuming its continued existence). On the other
hand, NATO has always been both a political and military alliance of free
states, as evidenced by its civilian and military structures. 143
NATO's formal principle objective as described in the Harmel Report of
1967, "To preserve peace in freedom, to prevent war, and to establish a just
and lasting peaceful order in Europe"' 44 speaks to today's situation. NATO's
basic purpose of defending and furthering Western values endures. It
remains the only structure where 16 like-minded North American and
European countries can discuss the political, economic and military factors
involved in the future security.
The critical questions for NATO are: to what degree will its structure be
used for purposes of long-lasting political coordination, and how will
NATO's efforts in this respect be rationalized with those of other existing
organizations such as the EC and CSCE? The continued success of NATO
requires a broadening of its agenda.
NATO is now working to build a new security structure for Europe
within which relations with the Soviet Union and its former satellite nations
will bc based on confidence-building measures and arms control verification
and the question of Germany can be resolved to the satisfaction of the other
143Kaplan, p. 70.
14 4U.S. House oi Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Statement of Raymond G. H.
Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State, Before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,
presented 22 March 1990, p. 6.
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nations in Europe and the West. The first step for the new NATO in the new
Europe assuming the democratizing process continues, is to establish
ccoperative security arrangements with the WTO countries aimed at
strengthening the present security structure. The second step is to transform
the cooperative security structures into an interlocking system of mutual
collective security. 145
NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Worner, outlined in December 1989,
the short-range tasks for the alliance:
* To create favorable conditions for the success of Eastern reform;
* To secure a CFE agreement and to carry out an orderly build-down of
opposing armed forces through balanced arm control
To consider the future political and security architecture that will result
from the transformation of the cold-war order to 'a Europe whole and
free and to a state of peace in Europe in which the German people
regains its unity through free self-determination.' 146
Shortly after Warner's outline, United States Secretary of State Baker
outlined the U.S. position on the new NATO:
" To build a new European security structure in which "the military
component is reduced and the political is enhanced," of which a CFE
agreement is the "keystone";
* To increase consultations on regional conflicts and weapons
proliferation, thereby making NATO "the forum where Western
nations will cooperate to negotiate, implement,verify and extend
agreements between East and West";
14 5Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreig7, Minister Federal Republic of
Germany, Speech at the meeting of the Western European Union,
Luxembourg, 23 March 1990, German Information Center, 30 March 1990, p. 3.
146Corterier, p. 146.
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* To develop further economic and political ties with the East though the
CSCE process; in particular to promote respect for human rights and
assist in building democratic institutions in the emerging democracies;
" NATO's most lasting effect may be to continue to act as an example for
the East by continuing with its vision,
a vision of cooperation, not coercion; of open borders, not iron curtains.
The reconciliation of ancient enemies, which has taken place under the
umbrella of NATO's collective security, offers the nations of Eastern
Europe an appealing model of international relations. 147
Taking these comments into consideration, Corterier defines six basic
functions for the new NATO148:
The concept that, because of the many uncertainties in the world today,
the West is better off with NATO than without it is largely believed to be the
prudent course. This "insurance policy" concept argues for designing a
defense posture that capitalizes on new opportunities to reassess and reduce
NATO military forces while preserving those elements which will be hardest
to restore. The broad objective for NATO has not changed: to deter military
attack against its members and to encourage reform and liberalization.1 49 That
is not to say NATO will not change; rather, the basic principles behind NATO
are just as important for its members today as before.
14 7Baker, "A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New
Era," p. 2-3.
148Corterier, p. 149-155.
149Robert M. Kimmitt, "Impact of Recent World Changes on U.S. Defense
and Foreign Policies," by Under Secretary for Political Affairs, before the U.S.
Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense, Washington,
D.C., 27 February 1990, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Current Policy no. 1260, p.4 .
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Corterier argues that NATO will need to push for finalizing of the CFE
treaty and consider now the contents of follow-on CFE agreements. 50 Public
opinion may see the formal arms negotiating process as slowing down
disarmament. Rather, unilateral disarmament may seem more attractive to
many. A dissenting opinion comes from Larrabee, who claims that since the
CFE framework is based on a NATO bloc to WTO bloc approach, it is obsolete.
He calls for the negotiating of a new framework after CFE I is
completed.15 1 Although the European balance in conventional forces is
improving, nuclear weapons still play important political and deterrent roles
in NATO strategy. 152 NATO could assist in increasing the momentum to
finish the negotiations on strategic arms reductions, known as START.
The Gensher plan for the unified Germany to be in NATO but with no
NATO forces stationed in the former GDR now has substantial NATO
support. Still, Treverton asks,
But what would NATO be in such circumstances, and what does
demilitarization mean for a country that will still have a large army on
its other half? Is is [sic.] reasonable, or wise, to expect a country to
demilitarize the territory around its (future)capital? 153
Treverton warns that continued American insistence for a unified




152U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Defense
Policy Panel, Statement by the Honorable Stephen J. Hadley, p. 4.
153Treverton, p. 7.
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alienating the Germans because Germans may eventually see the United
States as an obstacle to their unification. Regardless, there appears to be
concensus in the West that NATO must address the German question,
including dialogue within the CSCE framework with the WTO nations.
CSCE is increasingly being considered the model for the long-term
solution to European security, with every nation engaged in a broad range of
discussions ranging from many topics including security. CSCE began in the
1975 Helsinki Final Act and originally was associated with human rights. The
organization includes 35 nations from Europe and North America. Especially
encouraging for proponents of CSCE is the results of the CSCE Bonn
Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe held in April 1990. All
members, including every WTO nation, recognized the CSCE process as being
committed to "the relationship between political pluralism and market
economies."154
There are still many who are skeptical of CSCE because it is an
organization with no formal structure and no headquarters that relies on
conscience for resolution of disputes. Especially critical is Henry Kissinger
who sees a this system as an unworkable alliance, where "a major rogue
country would have a de facto veto over the actions of the so-called system as
a whole."'155 Goodby counters:
15 4Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe,
CSCE/KW2EB.15/Rev/1, "Proposal Submitted by the Delegations of Austria,
Finland, Liechtenstein, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia - Final
Document of the Bonn Conference", 11 April 1990, p. 6.
155Henry A. Kissinger, "The All-European Security System," The
Baltimore Sun, 16 April 1990, p. 15A.
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The essence of European security lies in the process of creating an
inclusive community of democratic nations. This is the special genius of
the CSCE and this is the way in which the CSCE process can contribute to
building a new European security system. In this sense, free elections are
as much a security measure as ceiling on tanks.'%
Another alternative in long-range security is an all-European Security
Council composed of select members of both alliances, including the two
superpowers, as well as some neutral and nonaligned nations. Expanding the
all-European dimensions of the current CSCE structure while transforming
NATO in a more political directions would help to counter Soviets' and
other European nations' fears of a reunited Germany. Germany could be tied
to NATO and the all-European security system of which the Soviet Union
and the former WTO countries would be an important part.' 57
Regardless of the final structure of a future military and political order in
Europe, Western nations will probably feel more comfortable with a
collective security system like NATO. In the short- and mid-term, CSCE's
most important contribution will be as a "facilitator and safety net."' 58
NATO can provide an important strategic role in the reform of the East by
remaining the security organization for Europe. NATO plays a fundamental
156james Goodby, Distinguished Service Professor, Carnegie Mellon
University and former U.S. Ambassador to Finland and Chief U.S. Delegation
to the Conference of Disarmament in Europe, "The Diplomacy of Europe
Whole and Free," paper presented at the "Helsinki II and the Future of





role, by virtue of its being the only security-orientated Western institution.
NATO provided a climate throughout its existence for West Europe to
develop. It is stability that East Europe needs in order to succeed in its
democratizing and economic development process. In addition, NATO can
assist in the transformation by assuring the Soviet Union that it will not take
advantage military of the present situation.
Out-of-area operations may become an important function for NATO.
Through NATO, a common response to new threats could be devised. The
new threats include drug trafficking, regional conflicts, environment,
terrorism and military technology proliferation can be a better solution than
individual action. In addition, NATO may be used in regional conflicts as a
stabilizing force. With the proliferation of missiles and nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, regional conflicts may present a greater danger.
E. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON NATO
What ultimately distinguishes the alliance is not just its longevity, or its
military force. NATO strives for a genuine community as outlined in the
treaty's preamble.
They (NATO members) are determined to safeguard the freedom,
common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on tlh-x
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.159
Details on the future of NATO are unclear today. Its future rests on its
continued evolution and a joint effort with WTO nations to make a balanced
military reduction. However, caution must be pointed out. The changes in
159Quoted in Kaplan, p. 219.
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Europe run the risk of placing a higher emphasis on European concerns over
overall Western concerns (including North America). Western security
includes North America. The United States will continue to feel a need to
maintain a strong diplomatic, economic, and military presence in Europe.
However, Europeans may begin wanting less of an American contribution in
solving European questions. Therefore, there is a risk of conflicting
interests.1 60
In the United States, the events in Europe and the Soviet Union, as well
as domestic fiscal problems, has caused the beginning of a national policy
debate. Americans are attempting to establish a strategic road map to guide
them the critical decisions. Part of the strategic road map deals with the
defense budget and how it should reflect the historic changes of 1989.
16°Kaplan, p. 184.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE BUDGETARY IMPICATIONS OF NATO-
WARSAW PACT CHANGES FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
A. INTRODUCTION
After analyzing the affects the changes in the Soviet Union and Europe
will have on NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, the study concludes with an
analysis of implications to the United States Department of Defense budget.
The United States moved into 1990 grappling with the debate on
restructuring the U.S. military in response to a diminished Soviet threat,
changes in Eastern and Central Europe and the nation's domestic problems.
Within the debate has been the question of how the U.S. role in NATO has
been affected by events in the Soviet Union and Europe.
The United States has largely fulfilled its historic responsibilities to post-
World War II peace of building democracy, economic freedoms, and respect
for human rights. The U.S. has assisted in the preservation of democracies in
Western Europe during very trying times and has helped to create a new
vibrant West Europe and Japan. For over 40 years, the United States, through
NATO, has been committed to militarily defending its fundamental
responsibilities. The events in 1989 are, by no small measure, a result of this
commitment.
The victory of toppling tyranny in Eastern Europe is a fundamental
victory for the United States, NATO and their strategy of containment,
however, the victory poses new challenges and dangers. All free people can
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rejoice in the victory, but, Americans move on as a nation to face other
challenges.
We have no choice. The United States faces complex and serious
economic problems, such as its trade deficit, a federal budget deficit of
approximately $160 billion (three percent of GNP), sluggish productivity and
growth and low savings rates, that over the long term may jeopardize its
prosperity and standing as a superpower. Although the United States
initiated much of the evolving world's technology, it is increasingly not the
one using it in commercial products. The majority of all major U.S.
manufacturers depend on foreign-made components. 16 1 The economic
quicksand the United States may be falling into has not been remedied by its
political system which seems unable to reach a consensus for meaningful
progress.
The executive branch seems unwilling to take an integrated approach and
the legislative branch has become so devoted to servicing constituent short-
term interests and political in-fighting that few of its members think in terms
of long-term national interests. Bipartisan solutions seem harder to reach the
more the problems fester.
With these problems in the United States at a time when major changes
are occurring in the Soviet Union and the rest of Europe, the U.S.
Department of Defense is facing dramatic transformation of new missions,
16 1Center for Strategic and International Studies, Conventional Combat
Priorities: An Approach for the New Strategic Era, May 1990, p.9 .
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force structure, and strategy to enable the United States to meet future
national security challenges. McNamara stated,
Gorbachev is presenting us with the greatest opportunity in forty years to
shift the basis for the formulation of U.S. foreign aid and defense policy
from 'Cold War' thinking to a totally new vision of Superpower
relations... Presented with that opportunity, it is time to rethink our
military requirements to assure a clear articulation between foreign
policy, security commitments, threat assessments, military strategy, force
structures, and defense budgets.162
The United States' role in Europe and to some extent in the world
generally has been altered. The Department of Defense (DOD) must
acknowledge that fundamental and irreversible changes have taken place. At
the same time, DOD must not allow the defense budget debate to be swept
away with euphoria; DOD must be prepared for new uncertainties. The
possible end of the Cold War does not mean the end of political, military, and
economic rivalry amongst nations. The changes in the Soviet Union and
Europe do not mean the end of struggle for power and influence in that part
of the world.
Therefore, DOD must be an integral element in determining the future
role of the U.S. military and having forces reflect it. Now is the time to
examine our next steps. President Bush's 1991 defense budget plan is the first
defense budget that responds to the 1989 events in the Soviet Union and
16 2 U.S. Senate, Committee on the Budget, Testimony of Robert S.
McNamara, To the Committee on the Budget of the United States Senate,
presented 12 December 1989, p. 1.
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Europe and may cause the "longest, most acrimonious, and, ultimately, most
divisive U.S. defense budget debate of the entire post-WWII era. '163
B. BUSH ADMINISTRATION 1991 DEFENSE BUDGET
Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney sent to Congress the
Administration's fiscal year (FY) 1991 DOD budget request amounting to
$295.1 billion in budget authority (BA) and $292.1 in outlays. Although the
BA totals were $10 billion less than the 1990 Reagan request of $305 billion,
Cheney anticipated congressional calls for further cuts. In his budget
statement to Congress in February 1990, we emphasized the need for careful
and prudent cuts and a United States' military structure based on known
threat capabilities.
Facing the uncertainty implied by this ongoing transition, America's best
stance is steadiness in its defense policies and posture in the short term.
We must make our military adjustments with an eye toward genuine
reductions in risks, not in anticipation of how we hope global events
will evolve. 164
In response to American global commitments and to counter neo-
isolationist tendencies, Cheney stated,
America's national security strategy should continue to opt for global
involvement over isolation. America's enduring global interest require
a significant ability to counter threats affecting those interests. We must
163james D. Hessman, "Glasnost-Induced Budget Cuts Imperil U.S.
Defense Program," Sea Power, March 1990, p. 25.
164U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Budget, Statement of
The Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, Before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on the Budget, in connection with the FY 1991
Budget for the Department of Defense, 7 February 1990, p. 1.
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maintain a forward presence in cooperation with our allies and friends
in key areas such as Europe, the Mediterranean, Asia, and the Pacific.165
The budget request was based on the broad national interest objectives of:
" The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation with
its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure;
" A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for
individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at
home and abroad;
" A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights,
and democratic institutions; and
* Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and
friendly nations. 166
The issue of burden sharing was included in the overall national strategy
which lead to the President's budget. The President stated in his
administration's National Security Strategy Report for 1990 that the United
States looks to its allies to assume a greater share in providing for the
common defense. He warned that the events of 1989 should not be used as an
excuse to replace burden sharing with 'burden shedding'. 167 The argument to
maintain of a strong alliance included a push for specialization of roles and
missions among NATO nations. "As we and our allies adjust our military
posture, each should emphasize retaining those roles it is uniquely or better
able to fulfill." 168 This is bound to be interpreted by some to mean that the
1651bid, p. 2.
166The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States,




European members of NATO should assume the primary responsibility for
the initial forward ground defenses and that the U.S. continue to be the
primary nuclear and space force.
The military component of the national strategy i based on deterrence,
strong alliances, a forward deployed defense, and force projection. The
cornerstone of the U.S. national security remains deterrence of nuclear attack.
The specific defense budget priorities that shape the FY 1991 request are:
" People: DOD must continue to recruit and retain high-quality _-ilitary
and civilian plofessionals, emphasizing training, quality-of-life, Ind
career satisfaction.
" Strong nuclear forces/strategic defenses: DOD needs to maintain
modern and survivable nuclear forces in order that U.S. deterrent is
completely credible to any possible aggressor.
" Versatile, ready, deployable, and sustainable conventional forces: U.S.
forces must have the capability to respond correctly and quickly to any
contingency worldwide.
" Continued maritime superiority: The United State, being a maritime
nation and dependent on overseas trade and resources, must maintain a
naval power capable of ensuring access to critical sea lines of
communications and projecting military power in the ares of U.S.
interest with less reliance on foreign bases or overflight rights.
" Reserve forces and mobilization: With the reduction of U.S. military
active forces, DOD must continue to improve the ability to mobilize
reserve forces including, personnel, logistics, infrastructure, planning,
and industrial base.
" Special operations forces: DOD must maintain a strong special
operations forces to deal with the rising threat of low-intensity conflict,
from terrorism to armed insurgencies.' 69
The FY 1991 defense budget request responded to the global changes
taking place in the following manner:
16 9 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Budget, Statement of
The Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, p. 5-6.
102
e Manpower Plans: Active duty end strength will be reduced 91,400 to a
total of 2,038,800. This reduction will put the overall active duty force to
approximately the same level as FY 1980 and the Army and Air Force
levels to 1950. DOD civilian end strength will reduce of 21,000 to a total
of 1,095,741. In addition, a civilian hiring freeze has been imposed.
* Force Reduction Plans: The Army plans to eliminate two active
Continental U.S. (CONUS) divisions. The Air Force will deactivate 14
B-52 aircraft in FY 1990 and will close the associated support activity in
FY 1991. The Marine Corps will begin planning for the deactivation of
14 artillery batteries. The Navy will retire two battleships and begin
planning for the deactivation of one nuclear cruiser in FY 1992 and
another over the three planned for deactivation in the April budget
revision. The Navy also plans to deactivate two SSN-637 class
submarines.170
The underlying strategy of Cheney's 1991 budget proposal favored
strategic programs. He proposed continuing new Midgetman ICBMs, the MX
missile in rail garrison basing, the B-2 Stealth bomber, and sustained funding
for the Stategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The defense budget was also based on
maintaining an investment in research and development for the purpose of
maintaining technological military superiority. It was also based on the
commitment for a competitive strategy which exploits U.S. strengths to make
Soviet armament less threatening.
At the same time, there are calls to reduce the defense budget, there is
mistrust in the way DOD spends. The President addressed, in both the
National Security Strategy Report and the DOD Budget Report, the need for
people to be confident in the use of their defense dollars. Reforms initiated by
Bush are based on the Packard commission's recommendations of 1985 and
170Ibid p. 7.
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the Defense Management Review is intended to implement improvements
in defense acquisition. The implementing process includes:
Reducing overhead Costs while maintaining military strength: DOD is
tasked with streamlining the acquisition structure, including clear lines
of of responsibility and authority. Services' systems and material
commands are being reorganized to focus on logistics and support
services, all contract service are being consolidated under the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA), and a Corporate Information Management
structure is being developed to provide more efficient data processing
and information systems.
Enhancing program performance: Whereas the military departments
under the Reagan administration largely ignored the people in the
office of the undersecretary for acquisition, Bush followed through on
the Packard commission's recommendation and enhanced the role of
this undersecretary. In addition, programs have to meet defined
milestones and satisfy specific criteria before continuing further in the
acquisition process, and the services are now tasked with creating a
corps of officers who will make acquisition a full-time career.
Reinvigorating Planning and Budgeting: The administration is
planning to reinvigorate the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS) through the Defense Planning and Resource Board.
Bush has also created a new Executive Committee, chaired by the
Secretary of Defense, to review overall DOD policies and permit regular
exchanges on key issues.
* Reducing micromanagement: A new streamlined set of directives are to
be issued to all services by the DOD that permits action at the working
level without additional policy guidelines. Here is where the Bush
Administration calls on Congress to work together to overhaul the
statutory framework for defense acquisition in order to increase
efficiency in the acquisition process.
" Strengthening the defense industrial base: Incentives to invest in new
facilities are being explored.
" Improving the observance of ethical standards: A DOD Ethics Council
was developed to review existing compliance standards. The goal is to
strengthen ethical standards within DOD and with industry and to
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create a working environment where the standards are understood and
enforced.' 71
The administration's response to the current environment pushed the
prudent approach in reshaping America's military posture. It called for
cautious and efficient adjustments to the actual changes in the threats and
coordinated arms reduction with allies. Finally, it challenged legislators to
allocate defense spending to meet objectives based on national security
interests, not domestic political or economic concerns.1 72
The national debate on alternative defense budgets is flourishing in light
of events and Bush's response. This debate has created an intellectual and
political environment in which participants, including all sector of the
government, academia, industry, citizen groups, etc., are articulating their
options for the future of DOD.
C SENATOR NUNN'S ALTERNATIVE
Senator Sam Nunn appears to have provided the most comprehensive
alternative to the current military strategy. In his "Defense Budget Blanks"
speech on 22 March 1990, Senator Nunn claimed the Presidents FY 1990
Defense Budget Request and Five Year Defense Plan (FDYP) contained five big
"blanks."
• Threat blank: The threat to overall U.S. national security is based on old
assumptions that did not reflect the changes in 1989:
" Strategy blank: The development of a new military strategy to respond
to the changes in the threat has not occurred.
171Ibid, p. 31-32.
172 ibid, p. 15.
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" Dollar blank: Secretary Cheney indicated that the FDYP has been
reduced by $167 billion from 1990's FDYP yet, DOD has identified only
$70 billion. Budget reduction of this amount requires significant
restructuring. If the U.S. has no way of viewing the defense programs'
outyears it cannot properly judge the FY 1991 defense budget.
" Force structure blank: Secretary Cheney and Joint Chief of Staff (JCS)
General Powell have both indicated that military force size will be
reduced over the next five years if CFE and Start agreements are
finalized. However, DOD has not provided a force structure reduction
plan beyond FY 1991.
Program blank: DOD reviews of major programs such as the B-2 bomber,
the C-17 transport, the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), the Advanced
Tactical Aircraft (ATA), and SDI. So far, DOD has provided a review report
on the C-17, ATA, and ATF, but not SDI. A report on SDI is still needed in
order to review before Congress can authorize and appropriate money for
SDI.173
Senator Nunn has concluded that a new military strategy should consist
of five essential elements:
" Although nuclear deterrence should continue to be the cornerstone of
our military strategy for the short- and mid-term, it should be achieved
at much lower levels and with a much higher degree of stability (with
reduced incentives for the Soviet Union to strike first);
" Deployed forces should be reduced consistent with changes in the threat.
Even more emphasis should be placed on specialization within NATO
and there should be a greater reliance on reinforcements with
deployable U.S. forces to support the allies;
" More forces should be put in reserve status specifically structured for a
reinforcement mission;
" Initiate a "flexible readiness" concept of high readiness for certain forces
and adjustable readiness for other forces; and
17 3 U.S. Senate, Speech of U.S. Senator Sam Nunn on "Defense Budget
Blanks," presented 22 March 1990, p. 4-8.
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Defense management and resources should be guided by 'think smarter,
not richer (or more expensive)' This includes the fly before buy
acquisition concepts, reducing costs of procuring and maintaining
weapons, improving existing platforms and reducing new start, initiate
innovative research to preserve our technological superiority and
preserving a viable defense industrial base.' 74
According to Senator Nunn, implementation of his new military strategy
will permit a BA reduction of $25-27 billion in FY 1991 with associated outlay
reduction of $9-10 billion. He has, thus, recommended a FY 1991 defense
budget of $289-291 billion in BA and $297-298 billion in outlays.' 75 Over a five
year period, Senator Nunn claims implementation of his strategy could save
approximately $225-255 billion in BA and $180-190 in outlays from FY 1990 to
FY 1995. The specifics required under his plan are:
Maintain nuclear deterrence at lower levels and with greater stability by:
keeping SDI Funding at the current appropriated levels of $3.8 billion;
slowing procurement of the rail MX and continue Midgetman but with
the goal of deploying the missiles initially in existing Minutemen ICBM
silos; and stopping development of a replacement to the Lance missile
system (Bush has already announced cancellation to the replacement
development).
Reduce forward deployed forces, increase specialization and emphasize
reinforcement by: reducing U.S. troops in Europe to 75,000-100,000
within five years; retaining reception forces (tactical planning units,
intelligence and surveillance units, command and control forces) at the
present level; emphasizing temporary assignment of forces overseas
including periodic rotation of Guard and Reserve units, emphasizing
lighter and more lethal Army and Marine forces, emphasizing the
mobility of forces including introducing a vigorous sealift program;
reducing naval deployments and operational patterns, retire older,
single purpose combat systems; and promote roles and mission
competition amongst the military services such as a sea control
17 4 U.S. Senate, Speech of U.S. Senator Sam Nunn on "Implementing a
New Military Strategy: The Budget Decisions, p. 1-2.
1751bid, p. 3.
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competition between the Navy's carrier battlegroups and the Air Force's
long range bombers and tankers.
" Greater utilization of the reserves by: increasing the number of aircraft
in reserve units, and transferring some missions currently conducted by
active duty to reserve units such as the tactical airlift mission or naval
countermine warfare.
" Flexible readiness (readjusting the readiness status of various forces
based on the threat, warning time, and availability of lift to transport
forces) by: launching a major program to invest in simulators to permit
enhanced proficiency training without employing expensive field
training;
" Implement a new resource strategy by: returning to the "fly before buy"
concept (conduct initial operational testing and evaluation before
constructing large amounts); emphasizing product improvements to
existing weapon systems as a alternative to designing new generations
of weapons; developing an approach to eliminate excessive production
capacity if the prime contractors' production rate falls to inefficient
levels; streamlining military services' headquarters organizations;
stopping projections of unrealistic high production rates; and
conducting cooperative research and development between the United
States and its allies.
Implementing Senator Nunn's military strategy and consequent defense
budget would mean significant changes to the United States relationship
within NATO. Reducing U.S. troops in Europe to 75,000-100,000 within five
years will require changes in the respective roles within NATO of the U.S.
and the allies that will go beyond the current reductions in manpower and
equipment. The United States role in a new NATO will be:
The new NATO will have to rely on "specialization through
builddown. 176 For the United States, this will require placing less
emphasis on forward-deployed heavy units and more emphasis on
rapidly redeployable forces capable of dealing with major regional
conflicts of crises outside Europe. Also, the United States will have to
176 Sam Nunn, "Challenges to NATO in the 1990's, Vital Speeches of the
Day, delivered before the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,
England, 4 September 1989, pp. 135-40, v. LVI, no. 5, 15 December 1989, p. 138.
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place a higher priority on providing major air components if adequate
shelters and minimum essential facilities are constructed by NATO.
Under Nunn's proposal, the U.S. will continue to be the main provider
of NATO's nuclear deterrence. The European members will have to
assume the primary responsibility of initial forward ground defenses.
The European initial forward ground defenses will have to be heavily
anti-armor and would not be able to rely on large numbers of forward-
deployed U.S. ground forces. Nunn suggests that the U.S. ground force
commitment to NATO should be restructured to provide NATO's
mobile strategic reserves, rather than NATO's forward defenders.
" Nunn suggests U.S. peacetime ground presence in Europe be largely
lead elements of combat units and combat support units. The support
units should include tactical planning elements, intelligence and
surveillance units, and command and control forces.
" The U.S. should maintain large prepositioned stocks of combat and
support equipment in Europe. Initial U.S. reinforcements of NATO
could be accomplished by transporting Army combat personnel from
the U.S. to Europe in order to break out prepositioned combat
equipment and reinforce NATO ground forces.
" Under Nunn's proposal, the U.S. would maintain some tactical air force
units in Europe for conventional and nuclear missions. The amounts
are not clear but the idea is to provide significant tactical air
reinforcement from the United States to Europe. At the same time,
Nunn calls on NATO to share in providing adequate numbers of semi-
hardened aircraft shelters, fuel and ammunitions storage, and
maintenance and operations areas at co-located operating European
bases.
" Finally, Nunn's plan calls for a new relationship for France in NATO.
Under his plan, the United States should strive to reach an agreement
with France to allow U.S. use of French ports, airbases, etc., for U.S.
reinforcing units in a period of emergency. This does not require U.S.
forces stationed in France but, does necessitate occasional joint exercises
of reentry capability between the United States and France. 177
NATO'S strategic strategy would change under Nunn's plan. NATO's
reliance on the threat of an early first use of short-range nuclear weapons to
z7 7 U.S. Senate, Speech of U.S. Senator Sam Nunn on "Implementing a
New Military Strategy: The Budget Decisions, p. 10-11.
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deter conventional attack is no longer credible. Ground-based nuclear
missiles and nuclear artillery in Europe should be phased out. There is still a
requirement to deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons in Europe though.
Nunn suggests that NATO emphasize tactical air-delivered nuclear bombs
and missiles, including Tactical Air to Surface Missile (TASM), and adjust its
modernization and arms control planning accordingly. In order to provide
shared risks and survivability, NATO's tactical air-delivered nuclear weapons
should be widely deployed at airfields throughout NATO, including in the
FRG.
Nunn' shift in key military missions challenges DOD to develop the best
defense program it can consistent with the remarkable changes that have and
continue to occur in the world. His goal of BA reduction of $25-27 billion in
FY 1991 and savings of $225-255 billion in BA and $180-190 billion in outlays
over the next five years will require tough decisions.
The Army will suffer most of the troops reductions in Nunn's
recommendation to bring the number of U.S. troops in Europe to 75,000-
100,000 over the next five years. The Army would have to redirect research
and development away from heavy new systems toward lighter, more lethal
advance technology systems. Nunn proposes the Army should examine the
following combat systems to determine whether or not they should be
eliminated or retired earlier than planned:




" M901 Improved TOW vehicles
110
* 8 inch howitzers
* Vulcan air defense guns
* IV-1 surveillance aircraft.
Under Nunn's proposal, one of the key issues with the Air Force will be
to make the B-2 bomber program more affordable. In addition, the Air Force
will be forced to adequately test the B-2 before being allowed to increase the
production rate above the two to three production aircraft per year that the
Congress has authorized in the past. The tactical airlift mission could be
transferred to the reserves. The Air Force will, under Nunn's plans be asked
to examine the following combat systems to determine whether or not they
should be eliminated or retired earlier than planned:
o RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft
o OA-37B observation aircraft






o Minuteman II missiles
The most significant impact Nunn's plan would have for the Navy
would be a re-evaluation of battlegroup deployments. Since the Soviet Navy
have reduced out-of-area (OOA) operations substantially in the last few years,
Nunn perceives no need for the Navy's six month deployments. He believes
the Navy can retain and exercise the capability to send carrier battle groups
worldwide without six month deployments in traditional operating areas.
Nunn estimates that a reduction in deployments and operational patterns
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could save approximately $12-15 billion in operating costs over the next five
years. With Nunn's emphasis on mobility forces, the Navy will be tasked
with providing a stronger sealift program. The Marine Corps., like the Army,
will be forced to move away from heavy forces to lighter, core lethal
systems.178
An interesting concept in Nunn's call for greater transferring of missions
currently conducted by active duty forces to Guard/Reserve units is the
concept of "nested" ships. The nested ships concept would apply to ships that
the Navy that does not routinely deploy with battlegroups, for example,
antisubmarine warfare frigates. The Navy could, under the nested ships
concept, station these non-deploying ships together into small groups of four
to five. One of the ships would be designated the mother ship and would be
manned 100 percent by active duty personnel. The remainder of the ships in
the "nest" would be manned by reserves. The active duty personnel would be
responsible for maintenance of all ships in the nest and training the reserve
crew for combat proficiency in an emergency.
The Navy/Marine Corps will be asked to examine the following combat





* OA-4 observation aircraft
* A-7 strike aircraft
178 bid, p. 11.
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* RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft
e OV-10 observation aircraft
* CH-53A model helicopters
* nuclear guided missile cruisers
* P-3A/B model patrol aircraft
* SH-3H helicopters
One of Senator Nunn's most interesting initiative is his suggestion to
encourage the military services to engage in "constructive competition for
roles and missions."179 Competition of roles and missions would force
civilian and military leader to break out of the pattern of looking at problems
in traditional ways. Competition would help to integrate thee various
capabilities of the services and do a great deal to eliminate redundancy.
Competition would also foster greater coordination among the services in
accomplishing a joint task. Specific areas for constructive competition are:
" Sea control competition between the Navy's carrier battlegroups and the
Air Force's long range bombers and tankers;
" Force projection competition between Army/Air Force and Marine
Corps/Navy;
" Close air competition between air support competition between the
Army's attack helicopters and the Air Force's fixed wing aircraft;
" Close air support, battlefield air interdiction, air superiority, tactical
airlift, and anti-submarine warfare patrol coverage competition between
active and reserve components;
" Competition between the Air Force with its dependence on large
satellites and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and
others advocating smaller satellites electronically linked and launched
by inexpensive launch vehicles;
" Inter-service competition to provide specific training and eduction;
179 1bid, p. 10.
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" Inter-service depots competition for ongoing modification and support
of fielded weapon systems;
* Central services and support competition between all services and the
Defense Agencies; and
* Competition between stealth Air Force aircraft and Navy fleet air
defense systems to test the advertised performance and capabilities of
each system.
Constructive competition could lead to refinement of capability for each
service and better integration of those capabilities at lower costs.
The Bush Administration has started on the road to redefining national
security and defense strategy for the United States in view of the changing
relationship between West 'nd East s. ice the events in 1989 and in an era of
fiscal constraints. The current National Security Strategy Report and the DOD
Budget Report reflects the first attempts in this difficult process. The
Administration has attempted to seize the opportunities presented by events
and situations and, at the same time, ensure that U.S. military power
continues to be strong for the uncertainties of the future.
Alternatives to the present defense strategy have flourished. Senator
Nunn has presented one of the most articulate and comprehensive options
for the U.S. defense of tomorrow. One of the most important contributions
Senator Nunn has made with his alternative defense program and budget is
to set a standard for discussion on defense.
The defense plan and budget of tomorrow requires four essential
ingredients: Fast planning, clear strategy, congressional consultation, and
popular support.
The administration, DOD, and all interested parties will have to move
quickly and make decisions on the direction of the defense budget plan very
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quickly in order to prevent piecemeal decisions. A recent report from the
Center for Strategic and International Studies stated, "Building without a
strategy is foolish; building down with one could be disastrous."l 80
A clear strategy for each of the military services is required. Otherwise,
each service will reduce its forces based on political needs, not on a
consolidated strategy focussed on the primary threats to national security.
The Administration and Congress must come together and work on the
DOD budget immediately. Some legislators desire large cuts; some legislators
want to maintain our defense, as is, for security assurance. Senator Nunn is
one of the legislative leaders that can help crate political support. Men with
the knowledge and commitment as him should be involved early in
planning of security strategy and legislative tactics.
Finally the defense debate should be done to include other segments of
society. Many industries and communities will be affected by final decisions






The objective of this thesis was to assess the current military forces
structure and alignment in NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations; review the
changes that appear to affect the status quo; analyze the options and
implications of change for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Western
Europe; review the implications to the United States in terms national
security interests and forces deployment; and, analyze the United States
Department of Defense's possible options in terms of forces and the budget.
This thesis was based on research data via a comprehensive review of
literature and also through personal interviews conducted with academics,
national security and defense officials and congressional staffs.
B. ANALYSIS
Analyzing the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it
appears that the changes are probably irreversible in several important areas.
There is relatively little chance of the Soviet Union regaining its hegemony
in Eastern Europe. The Marxis.-Leninist ideology is now discredited
throughout Europe. All countries in Europe have indicated a desire for
democratic pluralism and market models of economic development. Some
of the Eastern European nations are well on their way to such a goal, such as
Hungary and Poland; others are not on yet on their way, such as Romania
and Bulgaria. All the Eastern European nations will have difficulty in
making the transitions they desire. The long term outlook for the Soviet
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Union is very uncertain. Instability in that country is fueled by serious and
ever mounting economic problems.
As a result of the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the
Warsaw Pact threat to NATO and the united States has been significantly
reduced. The Soviet Union could not now count on Eastern Europe in
attacking Western Europe. The Soviets have tentatively agreed to remove all
or most of its troops from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The Soviet
drawdowns already carried out due to President Gorbachev's speech at the
United Nations in December 1988, have lengthened the time time it would
take for Soviets to mobilize a large scale attack in Europe.. However, the
Soviet Union continues to have a large and capable military force.
The future of European security is just now being formulated. The issue
of Germany is central to European security. Options for future security
structures abound which include NATO, the EC, CSCE, etc.. NATO has a
valuable contribution to the new European architecture. NATO can assist in
overcoming the divisions in Europe and can continue to reflect its members'
security. A new mission for NATO is needed which will reflect a greater
emphasis on NATO's political capabilities. NATO can greatly assist in
reaching arms control agreements, confidence-building measures, and other
political consultative arrangements with the WTO nations. As East-West
confrontation recedes and the prospects for East-West cooperation advance,
NATO can contribute to meeting the new challenges and helping in
determining the path for the evolution of European and Atlantic security.
The events in Europe and the Soviet Union, plus national fiscal austerity,
makes a debate on defense inevitable in the United States. A careful
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evaluation of the United States military structure, strategy and budget is
necessary. Americans must revise the military budget to seize the
opportunities presented by the events in 1989. At the same time, Americans
must maintain a military capable of defending our interests and meeting the
uncertainties of the future. Many options for future defense budgets are
available. Senator Nunn has provided a very comprehensive study on this
subject. The true challenge for future military budgets will be to use the
international opportunity to save money in a sensible manner that matches
defense spending with military strategy.
C. FUTURE DIRECTION
Follow-on study relating to the implications of the changing relationships
in NATO and the Warsaw Pact to the DOD budget could expand this thesis.
Future research could include review of :
* U.S. commitment to Western Europe in view of the altered defense
conditions in Europe.
" NATO's future conventional requirements and political and military
implications of a lack of a strategic nuclear force agreement.
" U.S.'s new logistic problems and ways to combat them if U.S. forces are
reduced in Western Europe.
" Cost benefit analysis of removing U.S. troops in Western Europe and
reaching an agreement with France for U.S. aircraft to use French
airfields, airbases, etc, in case of emergencies.
• Improved U.S. intelligence capabilities and the cost to improve U.S.
intelligence capabilities to help offset fewer troops in Western Europe.
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